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To the best of your knowledge, does the State of Israel currently participate or not participate in the conflict between Russia and Ukraine in any of the following areas?
| Areas | Provides | Doesn’t provide | Don’t know | Total |
| Humanitarian aid | 63% | 14% | 23% | 100% |
| Military assistance with weapons, ammunition, and other means | 38% | 33% | 29% | 100% |
| Assistance in intelligence data | 34% | 22% | 44% | 100% |
| Diplomatic support in international institutions | 40% | 21% | 39% | 100% |
| Acceptance of immigrants | 68% | 13% | 19% | 100% |
| Political asylum for refugees | 54% | 19% | 27% | 100% |
| Support for Israeli citizens participating in combat operations | 44% | 17% | 39% | 100% |
| Informational and ideological support | 21% | 36% | 43% | 100% |
Comparative analysis indicates a steady increase in the proportion of responses from April of the 23rd year to the present regarding Israel’s assistance to Ukraine in the areas of armament, intelligence, diplomatic support, and growing support for Israeli citizens involved in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. The percentage of responses related to humanitarian aid, hosting migrants and refugees, and information-ideological support is decreasing. In other words, Israelis increasingly declare a “militarized” involvement of Israel in the military situation in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, while the humanitarian aspect of support is mentioned less frequently.
The share of respondents who believe that Israel is involved in the conflict in Ukraine (for each direction in the temporal dynamics):
| Areas | April 2023 | July 2023 | November 2023 |
| Humanitarian aid | 79% | 70% | 63% |
| Military assistance with weapons, ammunition, and other means | 25% | 33% | 38% |
| Assistance in intelligence data | 24% | 28% | 34% |
| Diplomatic support in international institutions | 36% | 38% | 40% |
| Acceptance of immigrants | 80% | 75% | 68% |
| Political asylum for refugees | 62% | 55% | 54% |
| Support for Israeli citizens participating in combat operations | 38% | 39% | 44% |
| Informational and ideological support | 20% | 24% | 21% |
A significant difference based on the country of birth is noted only in responses related to humanitarian aid, which is mentioned less frequently by respondents born in the countries of the former USSR (61% compared to 71-72% in other countries).
| Country of Birth | Former USSR countries | Israel | Other |
| Humanitarian aid | 71% | 61% | 72% |
| Military assistance with weapons, ammunition, and other means | 36% | 38% | 35% |
| Assistance in intelligence data | 31% | 34% | 40% |
| Diplomatic support in international institutions | 42% | 40% | 42% |
| Acceptance of immigrants | 74% | 68% | 71% |
| Political asylum for refugees | 56% | 54% | 55% |
| Support for Israeli citizens participating in combat operations | 42% | 45% | 37% |
| Informational and ideological support | 20% | 21% | 19% |
Among the following possible risks, in your opinion, what is the main risk of Israel getting involved in the conflict between Russia and Ukraine as it stands today?
| Conflict and damage to relations with Russia | 48% |
| Conflict and damage to relations with Ukraine | 2% |
| Conflict and damage to relations with the U.S. and other countries | 7% |
| Economic damage, reduction in foreign investments, and the like. | 5% |
| Damage to the stability of Israel’s national security | 5% |
| Damage to Israel’s national stability from a social perspective | 2% |
| Damage to Jewish communities worldwide | 5% |
| No risks at all | 7% |
| I don’t know | 19% |
The conflict and damage to relations with Russia are the only risks that respondents have been discussing for a long time. The decrease in the values of responses characterizing this risk in November is most likely due to Israel’s war in Gaza. There are no significant changes in the values of responses among respondents differing by country of birth. Minor differences are present in responses based on political orientation. Representatives of the right-wing, left-wing, and far-left are more likely to discuss the risk of worsening relations with Russia (52-55% compared to 44-45% in other groups).
Among the following possible risks, in your opinion, which is the primary risk of the State of Israel getting involved in the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, as it is happening today? Dynamics of responses.
| Risks | April 2023 | July 2023 | November 2023 |
| Conflict and damage to relations with Russia | 56% | 54% | 48% |
| Conflict and damage to relations with Ukraine | 3% | 4% | 2% |
| Conflict and damage to relations with the U.S. and other countries | 9% | 10% | 7% |
| Economic damage, reduction in foreign investments, and the like. | 5% | 8% | 5% |
| Damage to the stability of Israel’s national security | 5% | 3% | 5% |
| Damage to Israel’s national stability from a social perspective | 2% | 2% | 2% |
| Damage to Jewish communities worldwide | 3% | 3% | 5% |
| No risks at all | 2% | 4% | 7% |
| Don’t know | 15% | 12% | 19% |
Conclusions
1. Over the period from April 2023 to the present, there has been a growth in the perceptions of Israelis regarding Israel’s assistance to Ukraine in terms of arms, intelligence, and diplomatic support for its citizens participating in the Russo-Ukrainian conflict. There is a decrease in the proportion of responses related to humanitarian aid, the acceptance of migrants and refugees, and information-ideological support for Ukraine. Israelis born in the former USSR report less frequently than others about Israel providing humanitarian aid to Ukraine.
2. The deterioration of relations with Russia is the only long-standing risk consistently mentioned by respondents. The decrease in response values characterizing this risk in November is most likely related to Israel’s war in Gaza.