



NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION

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Research report

Israel between the Collective West and the Global South

Israel

July 2024

Method: Internet survey among 500 respondents, Internet users aged 18 years and older, who constitute a representative national sample of this population in the State of Israel (Jewish and Arab sectors will be selected as part of this population).

The maximum range of statistical error under this sample conditions is +4.38%, and this is at a statistical significance level of 95%.

The study was conducted by the Campaign «Geocartography» using a questionnaire developed by Dor Moriah Analytical Center experts as part of the «Haifa Format» project.

DOES THIS CONFLICT EXIST?

In the modern world, competition is intensifying between two global forces - the collective West (USA, EU countries, Japan, South Korea, etc.) and the Global South (BRICS countries - Asia, Africa and Latin America). Israel, located at the crossroads between Asia and Africa, is at the center of this conflict. Israel is traditionally considered a US stronghold in the Middle East. The United States provides significant security guarantees to Israel, and Israel in return limits its economic relations with countries in the Global South. On the other hand, many of Israel's partners from the Arab world, such as the countries that signed the Abraham Accords, are members of the BRICS alliance, and at the same time cooperate with the United States.

The majority of Israelis are convinced of the existence of a conflict between the Collective West and the Global South: *a total of almost 70% of respondents fully and strongly agree with this statement.*




Table 1. Do you think there is a conflict between the Collective West and the Global South? %

I'm sure there is a conflict	I think there is a conflict	I think there is no conflict	I am sure there is no conflict	Don't know	Total
28.2	40.6	10.8	0.8	19.6	100

Moreover, **men are 2 times more often unequivocally convinced of the presence of such a conflict** (36.2% versus 19.8% of women).

Table 1.1. Do you think there is a conflict between the Collective West and the Global South? % /sex

Answer options	Man	Woman
I'm sure there is a conflict	36.2	19.8
I think there is a conflict	37.4	44
I think there is no conflict	12.1	9.5
I am sure there is no conflict	1.2	.4
Don't know	13.2	26.3
Total	100	100
	N=257	N=243


I'M SURE THERE IS A CONFLICT

Sex	Percentage
Man	36,20%
Woman	19,80%


Those surveyed with above-average income levels are most convinced of the existence of this conflict. Accordingly, respondents with income levels below average report this less often, but are much more likely than others to find it difficult to answer this question (**24% versus 13% in other groups**).

Table 1.2. Do you think there is a conflict between the collective West and the global South? %/level of material wealth

	Below average	Average	Above average
I'm sure there is a conflict	29.6	25	33.6
I think there is a conflict	33.7	48.4	44.5
I think there is no conflict	11.1	13.3	7.8
I am sure there is no conflict	1.5	-	.8
Don't know	24.1	13.3	13.3



Secular Israelis are more convinced of the existence of this conflict than religious Israelis, and, in principle, **the belief in the conflict decreases as the degree of respondents religiosity increases.**



The values of the conflict index demonstrate that **respondents with secondary education are less convinced of its existence than others.**

Table 1.3. Is there a conflict between the collective West and the Global South? %/level of education

	I'm sure there is a conflict	I think there is a conflict	I think there is no conflict	I am sure there is no conflict	Index*	Don't know	Total
Below the average	33.6	35.8	8	-	61.4	22.6	100
Average	21.9	38.5	10.4	2.1	47.9	27.1	100
I II degree and higher	27.5	44.2	12.5	.8	58.5	15.1	100
Total	28.2	40.6	10.8	.8		19.6	100

* calculated as the difference between positive and negative responses

The Jewish sector is more likely than the Arab sector to talk about the conflict (**70% vs. 54% overall**), and Israelis born in the former USSR are more likely to disagree than native Israelis (**25% vs. 10%**).

Table 1.4. Do you think there is a conflict between the Collective West and the Global South? /national identity and country of birth %

Answer options	Jewish sector	Arab sector	Israel	Former USSR	Other
I'm sure there is a conflict	28.8	25	28.5	21.9	31
I think there is a conflict	42.9	28.7	40.5	46.9	34.5
I think there is no conflict	11.4	7.5	10	25	6.9
I am sure there is no conflict	0.2	3.8	0.9		-
Don't know	16.7	35	20	6.3	27.6
Total	100	100	100	100	100
N	N=420	N=80	N=439	N=32	N=29

THE CONFLICT ESSENCE

Regarding the nature of this conflict, opinions have split into two widely represented camps. Adherents of the view that this is a conflict defining contemporary geopolitics constitute 41%. However, an even more significant portion (59%) is convinced that this conflict is primarily economic competition within the framework of the global economy between the countries of the Golden Billion and developing countries.



At the same time, a significant part of respondents (22%), mostly women (28% versus 17.1% of men), find it difficult to determine the essence of this conflict.

This question is a rare case where **there is no fundamental difference in the answers between secular, observant and religious Israelis**. There is not much difference in the answers of respondents separated by educational level. Perhaps respondents with the lowest educational level speak much less often about the geopolitical essence of the conflict (24.1% and about 33% in other groups).

Table 2.1. If such a conflict exists, which of the following definitions, in your opinion, characterizes its essence? %

Answer options	Man	Woman	Secular	Traditional	Religious	Total
This is mainly economic competition within the global economy between the countries of the Golden Billion and developing countries	48.6	39.9	43.7	46.1	42.5	44.4
This conflict defines modern geopolitics	33.1	29.6	37.2	29.8	32.5	31.4
Other	3.5	2.5	2	2.8	6.3	3
Don't know	14.8	28	17.1	21.3	18.8	21.2
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

However, **respondents born in former Soviet countries are significantly more likely to view this conflict as a geopolitical issue** (53.1% versus 31% for Sabras), whereas Sabras are more inclined to see it as primarily an economic competition (46.2% versus 31.1% for those born in former Soviet territories). **In the Jewish sector, nearly twice as many respondents perceive this conflict as defining modern geopolitics compared to the Arab sector (33.8% versus 18.8%)**. Conversely, in the Arab sector, nearly twice as many respondents found it difficult to answer this question.

Table 2.2. If such a conflict exists, which of the following definitions do you think best describes it? % / education

	Economic competition within the global economy between the countries of the Golden Billion and developing countries	Conflict defines modern geopolitics	Other	Don't know
Level of education				
Below the average	46	24.1	5.1	24.8
Average	39.6	32.3	1	27.1
Higher	45.7	34.7	2.6	17
Country of birth				
Israel	30.1	46.2	2.7	21
Former USSR	31.3	53.1	-	15,6
Ethno-national sector				
Jewish	44.3	33.8	3.1	18.8
Arab	45	18.8	2.5	33.5

It is interesting that those who affirm the existence of a conflict are more inclined to consider it a geopolitical phenomenon rather than an economic one (**39.5% versus 22.4% of those who answered that this conflict does not exist**).

Table 2.3. Contingency table of data on the existence of a conflict between the South and the West and its essence

	Those who believe that conflict does not exist	Those who believe that conflict exists
This is mainly economic competition within the global economy between the countries of the Golden Billion and developing countries	48.3	50
This conflict defines modern geopolitics	22.4	39.5

COUNTRIES INTEREST IN ISRAEL JOINING BRICS

According to the indices of interest we calculated for different countries regarding Israel joining BRICS, only India expresses such interest. It is the only country with a positive and significantly high level of interest (25 points), while all other countries show negative levels of interest.




Table 3.1. How interested or uninterested do you think each of the following countries is in Israel joining the BRICS alliance? %

	Brazil	Russia	India	China	South Africa
Very interested	6.8	6.4	19.2	9.2	5.6
Interested enough	17.2	10.8	31.2	15	11
Not very interested	27.4	29.4	18.2	27.8	21.4
Not interested	21.2	37.2	6.6	27.6	42.2
Don't know	27.4	16.2	24.8	20.4	19.8
Interest index*	-24.6	-49.4	25.6	-31.2	-47

*Calculated as the difference in varying degrees of positive and negative responses (for example, Brazil: (6.8% + 17.2%) - (27.4% + 21.2%) = -24.6)

Let us note that in terms of education and religiosity, no fundamental differences or stable trends were found. It is interesting that residents of the center of Israel speak more often about such interest in Brazil (very, very interested - in total, about 30% of respondents in this area report, and a similar maximum value in other areas is 23%), while disinterest in such cooperation is fundamentally more often said residents of Jerusalem and Asharon (almost completely not interested - about 60% in total, and among other areas - 50% and below).

Table 3.2. Country's interest in Israel joining BRICS %

		Jerusalem	Center	North	South	Sharon
Brazil	Very interested	2.4	10	2.7	3	2.7
	Interested enough	12.2	19.2	18.8	19	8.1
	Not very interested	34.1	30	27.7	22	37.8
	Not interested	29.3	15.4	23.2	28	21.6

Residents of the North and South most often talk about India's interest, and the Center's lack of interest. Relatively (but not fundamentally) higher assessments of South Africa's interest are given by residents of Asharon, and the lowest by Jerusalem and the South, although by and large the assessments here are quite even.

Table 3.3. Country's interest in Israel joining BRICS %

		Jerusalem	Center	North	South	Sharon
India	Very interested	19.5	17.7	22.3	21	16.2
	Interested enough	31.7	27.7	36.6	37	32.4
	Not very interested	17.1	23.1	14.3	16	16.2
	Not interested	7.3	6.2	5.4	6	5.4
South Africa	Very interested	2.4	6.2	2.7	2	10.8
	Interested enough	14.6	8.5	11.6	10	8.1
	Not very interested	24.4	24.6	17.9	20	13.5
	Not interested	48.8	40	50.9	49	40.5

The slightest differences in the responses of residents of different regions of Israel concern the interest of Russia and China in Israel joining BRICS.


Table 3.4. The country's interest in Israel joining the BRICS union %

		Jerusalem	Center	North	South	Asharon
Russia	Very interested	4.9	3.8	5.4	3	8.1
	Interested enough	14.6	11.5	10.7	10	8.1
	Not very interested	34.1	27.7	31.3	33	27
	Not interested	39	40	41.1	38	40.5
China	Very interested	2.4	5.4	8	5	10.8
	Interested enough	14.6	15.4	16.1	18	13.5
	Not very interested	29.3	33.1	25	23	27
	Not interested	36.6	24.6	33.9	33	29.7

An analysis of the “extreme” values of answers (the largest and the smallest) by regions of Israel showed that the residents of Jerusalem and Asharon, who equally give such assessments the greatest number of times, differ more than others in this parameter.

However, residents of Jerusalem are most often characterized by negative expectations from countries regarding Israel's accession to BRICS.

The difference in the perception of the situation in the Jewish and Arab sectors is noteworthy. **The Jewish sector is more convinced of the disinterest of almost all countries listed in the survey in Israel joining BRICS.** The exception is India, for which negative expectations prevail in the Arab sector. The Arab sector is more often convinced of the interest of all represented countries, except, as mentioned above, India.



Interest of countries in Israel joining BRICS /Jewish and Arab sectors %

		Not interested	Not very interested	Interested enough	Very interested
South Africa	Jewish	22.4	28.6	17.4	5.0
	Arab	15.0	21.3	16.2	16.2
China	Jewish	39.8	30.5	11.0	4.5
	Arab	23.7	23.7	1.0	16.2
India	Jewish	6.0	17.9	33.1	19.8
	Arab	1.0	2.0	21.3	16.2
Russia	Jewish	30.7	27.6	16.0	6.2
	Arab	11.2	28.7	1.0	25.0
Brazil	Jewish	46.0	20.7	10.2	4.3
	Arab	22.5	25.0	15.0	12.5

A comparison of the position of native Israelis and immigrants from the territory of the former USSR is more clear in the Country Interest Indexes, located in the table and diagram.


Table 3.5. Interest of countries in Israel joining BRICS % / country of birth

		Not interested	Not very interested	Interested enough	Very interested	Index*
South Africa	Israel	40.3	23	10.9	5.5	-46.9
	Former USSR	56.3	12.5	12.5	9.4	-46.9
China	Israel	26.2	28.5	15.3	9.3	-30.1
	Former USSR	40.6	21.9	12.5	12.5	-37.
India	Israel	5.7	18.2	31.7	18.7	26.4
	Former USSR	15.6	28.1	18.8	18.8	-25
Russia	Israel	36.2	30.1	10.9	6.6	-48.8
	Former USSR	50	18.8	15.6	3.1	-50.1
Brazil	Israel	19.4	26.9	18	7.3	-21
	Former USSR	31.3	31.3	12.5	6.3	-43.8

* The index of interest in joining was calculated as the difference between the sum of positive and negative responses. For example, India (born in Israel) (18.7%+31.7%)-(18.2%+5.7%) = 26.4


The index values show that **the expectations of the Sabras and immigrants from the territory of the former USSR converge with regard to the interest of South Africa and Russia**, and are close with regard to China.

But there are very large differences regarding the interest of **Brazil and, especially, India** in Israel joining BRICS. The difference in the values of the Indian interest index is more than 50 points (-25 for immigrants from the territory of the former USSR and 26.4 for the Sabras, which reflects their fundamentally more optimistic views on these relations); the similar difference in relation to Brazil is 22 percentage points.



ISRAEL'S PLACE IN THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE COLLECTIVE WEST AND THE GLOBAL SOUTH

There is a lack of any consensus regarding the idea of Israel's ideal position in the geopolitical coordinates.




The majority of respondents (35.8%), both men (36.2%) and women (35.4%), **consider it preferable for Israel to maintain neutrality and build constructive relationships with both the Collective West and the Global South**. The second most significant options are "Decisions should be made depending on specific situations and areas where Israel maintains neutrality or chooses a side" (22%) and "To side with the Collective West" (19%). There is a notable difference in the preferences of men and women regarding siding with the Collective West. This position is supported by 23.7% of men, while among women, this figure is significantly lower at 14%.

Only 3.2% of respondents believe that Israel should be on the side with the Global South—a value within the margin of statistical error, similar to the option "None of these options" (4%). This is likely to be viewed not so much as a negative attitude toward this position, but rather as an indication that **this option is not generally considered a viable choice.**

Table 4. In your opinion, what position should Israel take in the relations between the Collective West and the Global South? % / overall distribution, gender

Answer options	Men	Women	Total
Maintain neutrality and build constructive relationships with both sides	36.2	35.4	35.8
Make decisions based on specific situations	22.2	22.2	22.2
Be on the side of the collective West	23.7	14	19
Be on the side of the Global South	3.9	2.5	3.2
None of them	3.1	4.9	4
Don't know	10.9	21	15.8

As age increases, Israelis show a growing preference for neutrality and constructive relationships with both sides, as indicated by the Pearson correlation coefficient (r), which reflects an almost perfect positive relationship between these variables ($r = 0.99$).



Between age groups and the response **"Make decisions based on specific situations,"** there is also a strong, statistically significant but negative correlation ($r = -0.97$), indicating that **with increasing age, the tendency to make situational decisions decreases, while the inclination towards siding with the Collective West strengthens.** The positive correlation between the latter option and increasing age is $r = 0.79$. For the option **"To side with the Global South,"** the values fall within the margin of statistical error and are not indicative.

Table 4.1. In your opinion, what position should Israel take in the relations between the Collective West and the Global South? % / age

	18-34	35-54	55+
Maintain neutrality and build constructive relationships with both sides	29.1	38.1	47.7
Make decisions based on specific situations	24.1	22.2	17.4
Be on the side of the collective West	18.6	18	22.1
Be on the side of the Global South	3.2	3.6	2.3
None of them	3.6	5.2	2.3
Don't know	21.4	12.9	8.1

There is also a statistically significant positive correlation between the positions "Maintain neutrality and build constructive relationships with both sides" ($r = 0.98$), "Make decisions based on specific situations," and the degree of religiosity ($r = 0.96$). Conversely, as the degree of religiosity decreases, the inclination towards siding with the Collective West increases ($r = -0.95$).




Table 4.2. What position should Israel take in the relations between the Collective West and the Global South? %


Answer options	Secular	Observant	Religious
Maintain neutrality and build constructive relationships with both sides	32.2	36.9	46.3
Make decisions based on specific situations	21.1	22.7	27.5
Be on the side of the collective West	24.6	21.3	10
Be on the side of the Global South	4	.7	2.5
None of them	2.5	2.8	3.8
Don't know	15.6	15.6	10
Total	100	100	100

AWARENESS OF BRICS

As indicated by the data presented above, responses regarding the Global South generally fall within the margin of error and are therefore not subject to quantitative analysis. Meanwhile, Israelis tend to view Israel not as aligning with one side or another but rather as neutral, focusing on building constructive relationships with other countries. This suggests that despite the prevailing orientation towards the West, Israelis are open to mutually beneficial cooperation and good relations with the Global South.

But with whom should Israel build relationships? What exactly is the Global South? The most prominent institutional expression of the Global South is the BRICS organization. However, only 6% of Israelis are well-informed about this organization, and another 10% have heard something about it. The vast majority of respondents (55%) have never heard of it, which likely contributes to the low level of responses regarding Israel as part of the Global South.

Are you familiar with the activities of the BRICS organization?



As with most other questions, women are more likely to choose the "Don't know" option (63.4% compared to 47.1% among men). However, there is no significant difference in the level of knowledge about the organization. Awareness of this organization is also virtually unrelated to the degree of (non)religiosity or financial status.

TABLE 5.1. ARE YOU FAMILIAR WITH THE ACTIVITIES OF THE BRICS ORGANIZATION? %

Answer options	Men	Women	Total
Well-informed with the organization activities	9.3	3.3	6.4
Heard something about it	21.4	16.9	19.2
Heard only the name	22.2	16.5	19.4
Don't know the organization	47.1	63.4	55
Total	100	100	100

However, in the Arab sector and among those from the former Soviet Union, they are significantly more likely to speak about being aware of this organization and less likely to speak about not being aware than among Jews and native Israelis.





Table 5.2. Awareness of BRICS organization activities % /national sector and country of birth

	Sector		Country of birth		
	Jewish	Arab	Israel	Former USSR	Other
I know about the organization's activities	5.7	10	6.8	3.1	3.4
Heard, but don't know the details	18.1	25	18.2	34.4	17.2
Heard only the name	20	16.2	18	28.1	31
Never heard	56.2	48.8	56.9	34.4	48.3
Total	100	100	100.	100	100
N	N=420	N=80	N=439	N=32	N=29

The difference in awareness of this organization among groups categorized by secularity, level of religiosity, and material well-being is mostly within the margin of statistical error.

There is no clear trend between age and level of awareness, but differences in response shares do exist. Therefore, to determine the awareness levels by age, an index was calculated by assigning weights to each response option according to the degree of the parameter's expression. The highest weight (1) was assigned to the option indicating the highest level of awareness ("I know about the organization's activities"). As the degree of awareness decreased, the weights of the responses also decreased ("I have heard about it, but do not know the details," weight = 0.75; "I have only heard the name," weight = 0.35). The response indicating a lack of awareness was assigned a negative weight (-1). These weights were multiplied by the corresponding response values, which were then summed up. This approach allowed us to see not only the level of awareness but also to determine the prevailing characteristic of the parameter: awareness or lack of awareness. The results showed **negative awareness in all groups, with the prevalence of unawareness in the 55+ age group.**

Question 5.4 Level of awareness of BRICS % /age

	18-34	35-54	55+	Total
Know	9.5	5.2	1.2	1
Heard, but don't know the details	15.5	20.6	25.6	0.75
Heard only the name	17.7	20.6	20.9	0.35
Never heard	57.3	53.6	52.3	-1
Total	100	100	100	
Index	-24.6	-25.7	-30	

ISRAEL AND THE USA: (IN)DEPENDENCE

Israelis public opinion is characterized by a perception of a very high level of dependence of Israel on the USA in most key areas. In all the studied areas, the Israel dependence index has positive values, indicating dependence rather than independence. Moreover, three areas (military security, economy, and foreign policy) are characterized by a very high degree of dependence, with index values exceeding 50 percentage points on a scale ranging from 100 (maximum dependence) to -100 (maximum independence).





Table 6. To what extent do you think Israel's position depends or does not depend on its relations with the United States in each of the following areas? %

	Very dependent	Quite dependent	Not very dependent	Doesn't depend at all	I don't know	Index	Amount
Military Security	52.6	26.8	9.6	3.8	7.2	72.3	100
Domestic Political Stability	22	29.2	26.8	13.6	8.4	39.7	100
Culture and Science	12.8	23.4	38.6	16.8	8.4	27.1	100
Foreign Policy	42	36.6	10	3.6	7.8	69.4	100
Economic Stability	34.4	37.6	14.8	5	8.2	62.8	100

The answers regarding Israel's independence from the United States in different areas differ significantly in the groups identified by the secularity-degree of religiosity criterion¹, but a general trend is noticeable: **the values of the answers regarding Israel's dependence on the United States increase in all areas as the degree of religiosity decreases**. In other words, the highest assessments of such dependence are given by secular Israelis, and the lowest by religious ones.



¹ Due to the heterogeneity of the data, the Index of Israel's dependence on the United States in different areas was calculated by assigning weights to the answer options in accordance with the degree of manifestation of the sign: it depends very much - 1, it depends enough - 0.75, almost does not depend - 0.35, does not depend (-) 1. Then the index values were calculated as the sum of the products between the fractions of the answers and the corresponding weights for each option.

Table 6.2 To what extent do you think Israel's position depends or does not depend on its relations with the US in various areas? % /secularity – religiosity

		Secular	Observant	Religious
Military Security	Depends a lot	59.8	44.0	46.3
	Depends quite a bit	27.6	35.5	27.5
	Almost doesn't depend	5.0%	11.3	15.0
	Doesn't depend	3.0%	3.	6.3
	I don't know	4.5	5.7%	5.0
	Index	80.5	71.6	65.9
Domestic Policy	Depends a lot	23.1	15.6	20.0%
	Depends quite a bit	28.6	34.8	27.5%
	Almost doesn't depend	28.6	30.5	22.5%
	Doesn't depend	13.1	12.8	26.2%
	I don't know	6.5	6.4%	3.8%
	Index	41.5	39.5	22.3
Culture and Science	Depends a lot	13.1	7.8	10.0
	Depends quite a bit	27.1	24.8	11.2
	Almost doesn't depend	38.7	41.1	43.8
	Doesn't depend	15.1	19.1	30.0
	I don't know	6.0	7.1	5.0
	Index	31.9	21.7	3.7
Foreign Policy	Depends a lot	47.7%	38.3%	33.8%
	Depends quite a bit	36.7%	43.3%	37.5%
	Almost doesn't depend	7.5%	9.9%	16.2%
	Doesn't depend	2.0%	2.8%	8.7%
	I don't know	6.0%	5.7%	3.8%
	Index	75.8	71.4	58.9
Economic Stability	Depends a lot	42.2	25.5	21.3
	Depends quite a bit	36.7	45.4	38.7
	Almost doesn't depend	10.1	17.0	27.5
	Doesn't depend	4.5	4.3	8.7
	I don't know	6.5	7.8	3.8
	Index	68.7	61.3	51.2

The results of the responses to this question depend little on the gender of the respondents, and on age only in certain **areas – military security, foreign policy, and economics**. This is likely due to the importance that respondents attribute to these areas. In any case, in the mentioned areas, the **dependency index values**, calculated similarly to the previous question, **increase from younger age groups to older ones**.




Table 6.3 To what extent do you think Israel's position depends or does not depend on its relations with the United States in various areas? % /age

		18-34	35-54	55+
Military Security	Depends a lot	43.2	58.2	64.0
	Depends quite a bit	27.7	25.3	27.9
	Almost doesn't depend	15.	7.2	1.2
	Doesn't depend	4.5%	3.	2.3
	I don't know	9.5	5.7%	4.7
	Index	69.2	76.7	83
Foreign Policy	Depends a lot	35.9	49.5	40.7
	Depends quite a bit	35.5	34.5	44.2
	Almost doesn't depend	13.2	7.2	8.1
	Doesn't depend	5.0	2.6	2.3
	I don't know	10.5	6.2	4.7
	Index	62.1	75.3	74.4
Economic Stability	Depends a lot	30.9	36.1	39.5
	Depends quite a bit	35.9	39.7	37.2
	Almost doesn't depend	16.4	13.9	12.8
	Doesn't depend	6.4	3.6	4.7
	I don't know	10.5	6.7	5.8
	Index	57.2	67.1	67.2

By level of education, a reliable pattern of change in position regarding Israel's independence is noticeable only in the area of military security: **the higher the level of education, the more often respondents say that it depends on the United States.**

Table 6.3 To what extent, in your opinion, does Israel's position depend or not depend on its relations with the United States in the area of military security % / education

	Below average	Average	Above average
Depends a lot	47.4	50	56.2
Depends quite a bit	27.7	26	26.8
Almost doesn't depend	10.9	11.5	8.3
Doesn't depend	5.8	4.2	2.6
I don't know	8.0	8.3	6

In the group of respondents, distinguished by the level of material wealth, the fundamental differences in the answers also concern mainly the military security of Israel, and, to a lesser extent, the stability of the economy. **The higher its level of material wealth, the more often there are ideas about Israel's dependence in both of these areas.**

Table 6.4 To what extent, in your opinion, does Israel's position depend or not depend on its relations with the United States in the following areas: % /material wealth

		Below average	Average	Above average
Military Security	Depends a lot	45.7	56.3	57.8
	Depends quite a bit	23.6	30.5	32.8
	Almost doesn't depend	15.6	8.6	3.9
	Doesn't depend	6	1.6	2.3
	I don't know	9	3.1	3.1
Economic Stability	Depends a lot	32.7	39.1	28.9
	Depends quite a bit	33.2	40.6	46.9
	Almost doesn't depend	16.6	13.3	17.2
	Doesn't depend	6.5	3.1	3.9
	I don't know	11.1	3.9	3.1

Judging by the values of the index of Israel's dependence on the United States, the Arab sector considers it dependent in the sphere of military security and foreign policy more than the Jewish sector (the difference in the values of the corresponding index is 10 points). In the Jewish sector, the index of Israel's dependence is significantly higher in the domestic political sphere (the difference is 15 points), culture and science (25 points).

Table 6.5 Indices of dependence of Israel's position on its relations with the United States in various spheres: /national sector

	Arab sector	Jewish sector
Military Security	73.	63.4
Domestic Political Stability	37.2	52.6
Culture and Science	23.1	47.9
Foreign Policy	71.1	60.1
Economic Stability	62.9	62.2

If we compare the positions of natives of Israel, on the one hand, and those from the territory of the former USSR, on the other, then **in all positions native Israelis consider Israel's position to be more independent from the USA than the aforementioned repatriates.** The range of dependence indices for Sabras is 27-72 pp and the average value is 57.1, while for repatriates from the territory of the former USSR it is 35-83 and the average value is 69.5.

Table 6.6. Dependence indices of Israel's position on its relations with the USA in various spheres: /country of birth

	Israel	Former USSR
Military Security	72.3	81.1
Domestic Political Stability	40.2	55.4
Culture and Science	27.4	35.0
Foreign Policy	68.8	83.1
Economic Stability	64.1	72.5

IMPACT OF ISRAEL JOINING THE BRICS ALLIANCE ON RELATIONS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES

Israelis tend to believe that Israel joining the BRICS alliance will, in one way or another, affect relations with the countries and unions listed below. However, such forecasts vary significantly, indicating **a weak formation of public perceptions about this situation**. This is also evidenced by more than a third of respondents who found it difficult to answer this question.

Regarding the United States, 29% of respondents believe that Israel's joining BRICS will positively affect their relationship with Israel, while an equal percentage believe it will negatively affect it, and a slightly larger share of responses falls under the "don't know" category. A similar situation exists concerning the European Union and Russia. **Concerning Iran, only 6% believe that joining BRICS will improve its relations with Israel**, about a third think it will worsen them, another third found it difficult to answer, and roughly one in four believe that such joining will not affect Iran's relationship with Israel.

A somewhat clearer and most positive outlook is noted concerning India and Saudi Arabia. In both cases, the proportion of responses indicating a positive impact of this event is 2-4 times higher than the share of negative expectations, as well as the "no impact" option.

Table 7.1: How do you think Israel joining the BRICS alliance will affect or not affect its relations with the following countries? If it does affect, in what way?

	Positive	Negative	Will not affect	Don't know	Total
USA	29.4	29.6	8.4	32.6	100
EU	23	27.4	14	35	100
Iran	5.8	31.2	26.2	36.8	100
Russia	20.6	23.2	19.8	36.4	100
India	36.4	9.2	19.8	34.6	100

With respect to the USA, EU and India, the Israelis who observe tradition give significantly higher values of the index of improving relations.

With respect to Russia, the most optimistic assessments are given by religious Israelis, and with respect to Saudi Arabia - by Secular and Traditional.

With respect to Iran, the Index values are clearly negative in all groups, but they are most negative among religious Israelis (-33.7).

Do you think that Israel's accession to the BRICS union will or will not affect its relations with the following countries? If it will, then how? %/ secularity religiosity.

		Secular	Observant	Religious
USA	positive influence	27.6	35.5	22.
	negative influence	34.7	23.4	38.7
	Index (n_pos. – n_neg.)	-7.0	12.1	-16.2
	neutral	11.6	13.5	16.2
EU	positive influence	22.1%	27.7	16.2
	negative influence	32.2%	20.6	32.5
	Index (n_pos. – n_neg.)	-10.1%	7.1	-16.2
	neutral	24.1	24.1	28.7
Iran	positive influence	6.0	3.5	5.0
	negative influence	29.1	32.6	38.7
	Index (n_pos. – n_neg.)	-23.1	-29.1	-33.7
	neutral	29.1	26.2	23.7

Russia	positive influence	20.1	19.1	25.0
	negative influence	22.1	26.2	22.5
	Index (n_pos. – n_neg.)	-2.0	-7.1	2.5
	neutral	29.1	26.2	23.7
India	positive influence	34.2	42.6	41.2%
	negative influence	11.1	5.0	7.5
	Index (n_pos. – n_neg.)	23.1	37.6	33.7
	neutral	6.5	11.3	10.0
Saudi Arabia	positive influence	31.7	31.2	27.5
	negative influence	11.1	12.1	22.5
	Index (n_pos. – n_neg.)	20.6	19.1	5.0
	neutral	10.6	11.3	5.0
Average Index Value		0.25	6.6	-4.15

ISRAEL JOINING THE BRICS ALLIANCE: AREAS OF IMPACT

Overall, Israelis expect positive changes in all areas of the country's life if Israel joins the BRICS alliance. The most significant positive expectations are associated with economic stability and improvements in foreign policy. In these response options, the difference between positive and negative expectations is the most significant (15-18 points).

The difference between positive and negative expectations for changes in the fields of science and culture, as well as in the area of military security, is approximately 10 points.

The lowest expectations for positive changes are in the domestic political sphere, where the difference between positive and negative responses is 3 points.

The difference between positive and negative answers in the field of military security is 9.6 point.

Table 8: How do you think Israel joining the BRICS alliance will affect or not affect the following areas? If it does affect, in what way? (%)

	Positive	Negative	Will not affect	Don't know	Total
Military Security	30.2	20.8	14.2	34.8	100
Domestic Political Stability	20.8	17.8	25.6	35.8	100
Culture and Science	22.6	13.2	30.8	33.4	100
Foreign Policy	35.4	20.4	9.8	34.4	100
Economic Stability	38.4	15.4	11	35.2	100

N=500

Conclusion

1. A majority of Israelis are convinced of the existence of a conflict between the Collective West and the Global South. *Nearly 70% of respondents fully or largely agree with this assertion.* Secular men, Jews with above-average income levels, and those born in the former USSR are more likely to believe in this conflict, while religious women with average education levels from the Arab sector and those with below-average income are less likely to agree.

2. Opinions on the nature of this conflict are divided into two major camps: 41% see it as defining modern geopolitics, while 59% view it primarily as economic competition within the global economy between the Golden Billion countries and developing nations. The former group predominantly consists of Jews born in the former USSR, while the latter includes more native Israelis.

3. Israelis perceive only India as showing interest in Israel joining BRICS, with sharply negative interest values from all other countries.

4. Responses vary significantly by region. Northern and Southern Israelis are more likely to perceive Indian interest in Israel joining BRICS, while central residents are less likely. Central Israelis more frequently mention Brazil's interest, while Jerusalem and Asharon residents are more skeptical. Asharon residents rate South African interest relatively higher, while Jerusalem and Southern residents rate it lower. It seems that the most common for Israelis in this context are expectations from Russia and China: in their respect, the lowest differences by city in estimates of interest are recorded. The residents of Jerusalem and Asharon give the highest and least high estimates of the interest of these countries in Israel's accession to the BRICS, but the residents of Jerusalem are more often characterized by negative expectations.

5. The Jewish sector is more convinced of the disinterest of most countries listed in the survey regarding Israel joining BRICS, except for India, where negative expectations prevail in the Arab sector.

6. There are significant differences in expectations between native Israelis (Sabras) and former USSR immigrants regarding Brazil and especially India's interest in Israel joining BRICS. The interest index for India differs by over 50 percentage points (-25 among former USSR immigrants and 26.4 among Sabras, reflecting the latter's more optimistic views). The difference concerning Brazil is 22 percentage points.

7. There is no consensus on Israel's optimal geopolitical alignment. About 35.8% favor neutrality and constructive relations of Israel with both the Collective West and the Global South, 22.2% believe decisions should be situation-dependent, and 19% support aligning with the Collective West. Only 3.2% favor siding with the Global South, a figure within the margin of error.

8. With age, Israelis increasingly lean towards neutrality and constructive relations with both sides and alignment with the Collective West, while situational approaches decrease.

9. In most cases, responses relating to the global South have values that are comparable to the margin of error and therefore not quantifiable. Meanwhile, Israelis tend to see Israel as a country that does not occupy one side or the other, but rather neutral, building constructive relations with other countries. This means that despite the prevailing orientation towards the West today, they are not against mutually beneficial cooperation and good relations with the South.

10. The most explicit institutional expression of the Global South is the BRICS alliance. At the same time, only 6% of Israelis are well aware of this organization, and another 10% have heard something about it. The vast majority of respondents (55%) did not even hear such a name, which seems to be an important component of the low level of responses regarding Israel as part of the Global South.

11. In the Arab sector and among people born in the former USSR, they are much more likely to talk about awareness of this organization and less often about lack of information than among Jews and native Israelis. By age, the population of 55 + is characterized by the lowest degree of awareness.

12. Israeli public opinion is distinguished by the idea of a very high level of Israeli dependence on the United States in most key areas. In all studied areas, the values of the index we calculated have a high dependence rate. Moreover, three areas (military security, economy and foreign policy) are characterized by a very high degree of dependence with index values above 50 pp

in the index measurement range from + 100 (maximum dependence) to -100 (maximum independence). Secular Israelis give the highest estimates of such dependence, and religious ones give the lowest. The values characterizing Israel's dependence on the United States increase from younger age groups to older.

13. In the groups of respondents identified by the level of material wealth and education, the fundamental differences in the answers concern mainly the military security of Israel, and, to a lesser extent, the stability of the economy: the higher the level of both, the more often there are judgments about Israel's dependence in these areas.

14. In the Arab sector, more than in the Jewish sector, Israel is considered dependent on military security and foreign policy. In the Jewish sector, it is fundamentally more common to report on Israel's dependence in the domestic political sphere, as well as in the spheres of culture and science. Native Israelis consider Israel's position more independent from the United States than the repatriates of the countries of the former Union.

15. Israelis tend to believe that one way or another, Israel's accession to the BRICS union will affect relations with other countries and unions. Meanwhile, the forecasts differ significantly among themselves, which allows us to talk about the weak formation in the public consciousness of the Israelis of the idea of the possibility of Israel joining this union. This is also evidenced by more than a third of the respondents who found it difficult to answer this question. Regarding the United States, 29% of respondents say that Israel's accession to the BRICS will have a positive effect on their attitude with Israel; the same number say that it is negative, and a slightly larger proportion of answers fall on the "I don't know" option.

A similar situation is developing around determining the nature of the change in attitude on the part of the EU, as well as Russia. With regard to Iran, only 6% believe that this will contribute to improving its relations with Israel, about a third - deterioration and found it difficult to answer this question, and about one in four believes that such an accession will not affect Iran's attitude towards Israel.

16. A somewhat more definite and most positive situation is recorded in relation to India and Saudi Arabia. In both cases, the proportion of responses about the positive impact of this event is 2-4 times higher than the proportion of negative expectations.

17. For the United States, the EU and India, fundamentally higher values of the relationship improvement index are given by Israelis who observe the tradition.

In relation to Russia, the most optimistic assessments are given by religious Israelis, and in relation to Saudi Arabia - secular and observing tradition.

In relation to Iran, the values of the Index in all groups are pronounced negative, but they are most negative among religious Israelis.

18. In general, if Israel joins the BRICS alliance, Israelis expect positive changes in all areas of the country's life. They associate the most positive expectations with economic stability and improved foreign policy.