

SOCIAL DIVISIONS IN ISRAEL

**Analytical Report Based on National Sociological Survey
Data**

**Analytical Center NGO "Dor Moriah"
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I. Introduction

Divisions within Israeli society are not a new topic, yet they remain perpetually relevant. In times of crisis, such as the current situation, these divisions carry an increased risk of public conflict, even to the point of civil confrontation. This is especially perilous amidst external threats, when social cohesion becomes a critically important factor in national security and state resilience.

When we began the Haifa Format project in 2017, we were aware that the radicalization of political agendas and the dehumanization of political opponents—phenomena we observed in Ukraine—represented a strategy we hoped to avoid in Israel. Unfortunately, our concerns have proven accurate: in Israel in 2024, we see a society strained by multiple socio-political divides. We are witnessing all the signs of radicalization and the dehumanization of political opponents that, in Ukrainian society, contributed to civil discord and armed conflict with the Russian Federation.

In response, the Dor Moriah Analytical Center, in partnership with Israel’s leading sociological institutions Maagar Mochot and Geocartographia, launched a large-scale investigation of this phenomenon. During 2023-2024, a series of 12 sociological surveys based on representative samples was conducted to deeply explore social divisions and the mechanisms underlying competing beliefs within Israeli society.

The final survey in this series, “Israel’s Social Divides,” conducted in October of this year, included 1,005 respondents aged 18 and older (with a margin of error of 3.1% at a 95% confidence level) and focused on **six primary dichotomies representing potential divisions** within Israeli society.

II. Research Methodology and Sample Composition

The primary objective of this study was to identify risk-prone divisions within Israeli society that could contribute to social destabilization. To investigate these societal fractures, we focused on six dichotomies (contrasting, interrelated positions) concerning key issues in Israeli society:

1. *The character of the State of Israel: Should it primarily be a State of Halakha or a Secular State?*
2. *The preferred model of state governance: One state for two peoples or two states for two peoples?*
3. *Israel's politico-economic orientation: Should it align with the Collective West or pivot towards the Global South?*
4. *Israel's role in the world: Does Israel have a unique mission in the world, or does it not?*
5. *The ideological foundation of Israel: Should it be based on Religious Zionism or Secular Zionism?*
6. *The Jewish people: Are they the chosen people of God or one of the ancient peoples?*

To measure societal divisions, we developed a questionnaire using the semantic differential method, where each question is presented as a horizontally scaled continuum with polar positions on either side, representing each dichotomy.¹

Respondents were asked to indicate on this scale the position that best reflected their opinion, with proximity to the center of the scale indicating a moderate stance and proximity to the poles indicating a more radical stance.

Responses were coded using a 10-point system, where the radical answers on the scale's edges received a score of 1 or 10. A score of 1 indicated maximum agreement with the position on the left side of the scale, while 10 indicated maximum agreement with the position on the right.

Values between the poles represented varying degrees of agreement with each stance.

Values from 4 to 7, at the scale's center, were considered moderate.

The sample size consisted of 1,005 individuals representing Israel's population aged 18 and older. The margin of statistical error was 3.1% with a confidence level of 95%.

¹ Example of the scale:

Question 1. Israel is, first and foremost: a Halakha state or a secular state?

Halakha State 1 ____ 2 ____ 3 ____ 4 ____ 5 ____ 6 ____ 7 ____ 8 ____ 9 ____ 10 Secular State 11. Don't know.

Socio-demographic Parameters of the Sample

Region	N (%)	Level of Education	N (%)	Secularity - Religiousness	N (%)
Galilee and Golan	28 (17.5)	Primary	13 (1.3)	Secular	402 (47.6)
Nazareth and Surroundings	40 (25.0)	Incomplete Secondary	19 (1.9)	Traditional Observer	286 (33.8)
Carmel and Surroundings	15 (9.4)	Secondary	233 (23.2)	Religious	113 (13.4)
Wadi Ara	12 (7.5)	Vocational	214 (21.3)	Ultra-religious	44 (5.2)
Ha-Meshulash	23 (14.4)	Bachelor's Degree	353 (35.1)	<i>Total</i>	845 (100)
South	7 (4.4)	Master's Degree	146 (14.5)	<i>Missing Data</i>	160
Mixed Cities	35 (21.9)	Doctorate	15 (1.5)		
<i>Total</i>	160 (100)	No Response	12 (1.2)		
<i>Missing Data</i>	845	<i>Total</i>	1005 (100)	National Identity	N (%)
Region of Residence	N (%)	Gender	N (%)	Jew	843 (83.9)
Jerusalem	85 (10.1)	Male	501 (49.9)	Arab - Muslim	113 (11.2)
Center	272 (32.2)	Female	504 (50.1)	Arab - Christian	20 (2)
North	216 (25.6)	<i>Total</i>	1005 (100)	Druze	26 (2.6)
South	206 (24.4)			Arab - Other	1 (.1)
Sharon	66 (7.8)			Other	2 (.2%)
<i>Total</i>	845 (100)			<i>Total</i>	1005 (100)
<i>Missing Data</i>	160				

For the analysis of divisions, the following parameters were used:

- *emotional charge of the issue* – the sum of radical answers (1 and 10) or, in the absence of a bipolar distribution, the value of one radical answer. When the emotional charge is low, the likelihood of conflict between opposing sides is not high.
- *characteristics of polarization: **Whether the distribution of answers is one- or two-polar, or apolar (if radical answers are absent).***
- *polar positions* – the share of respondents who selected the polar response options (1 and 10).
- *moderate positions* – the sum of responses from options in the center of the scale (4-7 points).
- *general support values* – the sum of answers reflecting varying degrees of support for each position (options 1-5 and 6-10).
- *"don't know" responses* – this indicates the level of awareness on the topic, as well as the relevance of the discourse.
- *polarization coefficient* – the difference between values characterizing polar positions: if there is a statistically significant share of polar answers, the lower the polarization coefficient, the higher the conflict potential of the divide.
- *the ratio of polar and moderate positions* – indicates the possibility for public dialogue.
- *the ratio of emotional charge to the polarization coefficient* – a key characteristic of the conflict potential of the dichotomy.
- high polarization coefficient with a large number of respondents uncertain about their answer:

a) a marker of the absence of this issue in public-political discourse,

b) or an indication that the public-political discourse lacks positions that a significant portion of the population could consider (whether or not those positions are deemed successful) in response to the situation's challenges.

As a hypothesis to explain the mechanisms of societal divisions, we developed the concept of "Ontological Bubbles."

An "Ontological Bubble" is defined as a phenomenon in which complex historical events and fundamental societal ideas split into opposing simplified versions. For example, the complex history of Israel's creation, where secular Zionists leaned on religious tradition, eventually split into two irreconcilable camps: supporters of a secular state and advocates of a theocracy. The danger of this phenomenon is that people on opposite sides of such a division create antagonistic worldviews. They reject facts that contradict their version of reality, cease to view their opponents as equal participants in dialogue, and derive emotional satisfaction from confirming their own correctness. This creates a vicious cycle, where an initially unified history becomes a field of endless eschatological conflict.

To test this hypothesis, in the second stage—statistical data processing—we used factor, **correlation, and regression analysis methods** to identify the relationships between the 12 narratives forming the extreme positions within each of the six dichotomies, and to uncover the hidden factors behind these narratives. These factors, after being tested and refined through correlation and regression analysis, are hypothesized to be the key characteristics of the Ontological Bubble, constructed on dialectically interconnected and simultaneously mutually exclusive positions.

II. KEY FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

Polarization and Divisions in Israel

1. The most important condition for the societal divides existence is the emotional charge of the issue.

As shown in Diagram 1, the dichotomy with the highest emotional charge, calculated as the sum of radical answers, is:

“Jews are the chosen people” vs “Jews are one of many ancient peoples.”

This is followed by a significant gap with the following dichotomies:

- "Israel has a unique mission in the world" vs "Israel has no unique mission."
- Preferred ideology: "Religious Zionism" vs "Secular Zionism."
- Preferred model for post-war state organization: "One state for two peoples" vs "Two states for two peoples."

These are the only positions where it makes sense to analyze the degree of conflict potential in the division.




Diagram 1

However, high emotional charge alone is not enough for a dichotomy to acquire a conflictual nature. An important condition for activating the conflict potential of a dichotomy is the presence of polarization.

2. Polarization Characteristics

It should be noted that there may be no polarization at all if the answers are concentrated in the center of the scale or at one of its poles. In our study, there are no apolar dichotomies; rather, we have mono- and bipolar dichotomies, where **radical positions** (ratings of 1 and 10) are concentrated at one or two poles.

As mentioned earlier, monopolarity, when there is high emotional charge, is considered a marker of high consolidatory and mobilization potential. In our study, an example of this is the dichotomy "Jews are the chosen people" vs "Jews are one of many ancient peoples." This dichotomy has the highest emotional charge (58.9% – see Diagram 1), along with one of the highest values for the polarization index – the difference between the values of the polar answers (see Diagram 2).

Radical **support for the position of Jews as the chosen people** is expressed by 42.4% of respondents (the highest support value among all positions) compared to 16.5% of respondents who strongly assert the opposite. Such an imbalanced bipolarity (almost half of the society against roughly one-seventh) is unlikely to lead to a conflictual confrontation that could affect the entire society. Furthermore, it suggests that this position has a **consolidatory-mobilizing potential and even claims the role of a nation-building narrative.**

Indeed, the **overall support for this position**, indicated by the sum of responses that reflect varying degrees of agreement with it (ratings 1-5), constitutes an absolute majority – 63.7% (Table 1).

Table 1. Are Jews the Chosen People or One of Many Ancient Peoples?

1 The Chosen People		2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10 One of Many Ancient Peoples	Don't Know
Frequency (n)	426	42	50	72	49	65	40	35	13	166	47
Valid Percent (%)	42.4	4.2	5	7.2	4.9	6.5	4	3.5	1.3	16.5	4.7
Overall Support (%)	Σ 1-5 63.7					Σ 6-10 31.8					
Moderate Position (%)				22.6							

Another instance of monopolar response distribution is the question of Israel's unique mission in the world.

Nearly 40% of Israelis are firmly convinced that Israel has a unique global mission, with only 7.6% in definite disagreement. Furthermore, similar to the previous case, an **absolute majority—60.1%**—shares, to varying degrees, the belief in Israel's unique global mission, suggesting a nation-forming potential for this narrative as well.

Table 2. Does Israel Have a Unique Global Mission?

1 Completely Disagree		2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10 Completely Agree	Don't Know
Frequency (n)	76	46	70	76	71	70	65	54	31	383	63
Valid Percent (%)	7.6	4.6	7	7.6	7.1	7	6.5	5.4	3.1	38.1	6.3
Overall Support (%)	∑ 1-5 33.9						∑ 6-10 60.1				
Moderate Position (%))				28.2							

Monopolarity in a dichotomy with low emotional intensity suggests an established societal paradigm on the issue, often perceived as the "natural" order of things. As a result, the topic tends to be relegated to the periphery of public consciousness. An example from our study is the question of Israel's political and economic orientation. According to the data in Table 3, **a majority of Israelis view Israel as politically and economically aligned exclusively with the West.** A strong 31.6% of respondents expressed categorical support for a Western orientation, with only 2% adopting the opposing viewpoint. That is, there is no apposition, the emotional charge of this dichotomy is the lowest (33.5%), and the proportion of respondents who found it difficult to answer is among the two highest (15.4%).

The monopolarity of these views, along with over a quarter of respondents (27.3%) holding a moderate stance (scores 4-7), likely indicates that **the prevailing societal paradigm of Israel's Western orientation is not a source of conflict among population groups.** Furthermore, a total of 60% of respondents support, to varying degrees, the notion of Israel aligning more closely with the West, reflecting a public consensus on this issue. At the same time, **the broad range of moderate opinions might be interpreted as a certain openness to non-radical modifications of this paradigm, especially in the context of limited public discourse on the matter.**

Table 3. Should Israel Politically and Economically Progress Toward the East (i.e., the Global South - BRICS countries, Asia, Africa, and Latin America) or Orient Toward the Collective West (USA, EU)?

1 Collective West		2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10 Global South	Don't Know
Frequency (n)	318	56	77	62	84	62	65	50	57	19	154
Valid Percent (%)	31.6	5.6	7.7	6.2	8.4	6.2	6.5	5	5.7	1.9	15.4
Overall Support (%)	Σ ₁₋₅ =59.5						Σ ₆₋₁₀ =25.3				
Moderate Position (%))				27.3							

Bipolar dichotomies, which are characterized by a significant number of radical responses, carry higher risks of public conflict. *These risks increase especially when the proportion of radical supporters on both sides becomes more evenly matched—specifically, as the polarization coefficient approaches zero.*

Diagram 2 shows that the lowest polarization coefficient values are associated with the distribution of responses regarding the preferred model for Israel's post-war state structure, as well as two questions concerning the secular versus religious nature of the Jewish state ("Halachic State" vs. "Secular State" and "Secular Zionism" vs. "Religious Zionism").




Diagram 2

In the "Israel as a Halachic State vs. Secular State" dichotomy, the polarization coefficient is relatively low (3.2%), suggesting a certain balance between opposing forces. This balance could lay the groundwork for potential conflict. However, the emotional charge around this topic is among the lowest (34%), and a significant portion of the population (41.6%) holds a moderate position. This indicates a relatively low level of conflict potential in this divide with regard to destabilizing Israeli society. Additionally, this moderate leaning suggests **a foundation for dialogue, which further reduces the risk of a conflict escalation.**

In discussing this dichotomy, we observe a slight tilt **toward secularism**. Although the proportion of respondents with polar views is statistically close, with a marginal difference within the margin of error (18.5% expressing strong agreement with the secular state stance versus 15.3% supporting the radical opposite stance, i.e., Israel as a Halachic state), a gradual increase in responses beginning from position 5 toward the "Secular State" pole is noticeable. The cumulative responses indicating various levels of agreement with Israel as a Halachic state amount to 44.5%, while those favoring a secular state total 52%.

Table 4. Israel, First and Foremost: Halachic State or Secular State?

1 Halachic State		2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10 Secular State	Don't Know
Frequency (n)	154	37	67	84	105	137	92	82	25	185	37
Valid Percent (%)	15.3	3.7	6.7	8.4	10.4	13.6	9.2	8.2	2.5	18.5	3.7
Overall Support (%)	Σ 1-5 44.5						Σ 6-10 52				
Moderate Position (%)				41.6							

In the "One State - Two Nations" vs. "Two States - Two Nations" dichotomy, the polarization index is slightly lower (2.8) than in the previous dichotomy, yet the emotional charge is significantly higher (40%). This places this dichotomy among the most emotionally charged, highlighting its higher potential for societal conflict. This is further supported by the fact that the proportion of polarized responses is 1.5 times higher than the moderate positions, which account for only 27.2% of the responses.

Table 5. Model of Israel's Political Structure: One State - Two Nations / Two States - Two Nations

1 One State - Two Nations	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10 Two Nations - Two States	Don't Know
Frequency (n)	215	32	63	65	65	92	51	53	27	187
Valid Percent (%)	21.4	3.2	6.3	6.5	6.5	9.2	5.1	5.3	2.7	18.6
Overall Support (%)	$\sum_{1-5} 43.9$					$\sum_{6-10} 40.9$				
Moderate Position (%)				27.2						

In the "Religious Zionism" vs. "Secular Zionism" dichotomy, a similar pattern emerges as observed in the previous dichotomy, given that both the polarization index (5.1%) and the emotional charge (41.7%) are comparable. However, in this case, the proportion of respondents holding **extreme positions on either side of the Zionist spectrum is significantly higher (41.7%) than those with moderate views (28.5%)**, with secular Zionists slightly outnumbering religious Zionists. This distribution highlights a societal divide, **where the relatively lower proportion of moderate views underscores the depth of the divide and the limited foundation for public dialogue.**

Table 6. Are Your Beliefs Closer to Religious or Secular Zionism?

1 Religious Zionism	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10 Secular Zionism	Don't Know
Frequency (n)	184	44	58	59	82	77	67	54	41	235
Valid Percent (%)	18.3	4.4	5.8	5.9	8.2	7.7	6.7	5.4	4.1	23.4
Overall Support (%)	$\sum_{1-5} 42.6$					$\sum_{6-10} 47.3$				
Moderate Position (%)				28.5						

Thus, at the present moment, the dichotomies "Religious Zionism" vs "Secular Zionism" and "One State - Two Nations" vs "Two States – Two Nations" carry the highest risks of becoming instruments for the Israeli society division.

Table 7. Summary Table of Values Based on Key Parameters for Social Divides Analyzing

Dichotomies: Values of Radical Positions² and Overall Polarization ($\sum 1-5$ and $\sum 6-10$) ³ .			Type of Polarization and Polarization Coefficient ⁴	Moderate Position ⁵	Difficult to Answer	Emotional Charge of the Issue ⁶
<i>Israel is a:</i>	<i>Halakhic State</i> 15.3% ($\sum 1-5=44.5\%$)	<i>Secular State</i> 18.5% ($\sum 6-10=52\%$)	3.2% bipolarity	41.6%	3.7%	34%
<i>Preferred Model of Israel's Political Structure:</i>	<i>One State - Two Nations</i> 21.4% ($\sum 1-5=43.9\%$)	<i>Two States – Two Nations</i> 18.6% ($\sum 6-10=40.9\%$)	2.8% bipolarity	27.2%	15.4%	40%
<i>Politically and Economically, Israel Should Move Towards:</i>	<i>Collective West</i> 31.6% ($\sum 1-5=59.5\%$)	<i>Global South</i> 1.9% ($\sum 6-10=25.3\%$)	29.7% monopolarity	27.3%	15.4%	33.5%
<i>Does Israel Have a Unique Mission in the World?</i>	<i>Does Not Exist</i> 7.6% ($\sum 1-5=33.9\%$)	<i>Exists</i> 38.1% ($\sum 6-10=60.1\%$)	30.5% monopolarity	28.2%	6.3%	45.8%
<i>Are Your Beliefs Closer to Religious or Secular Zionism?</i>	<i>Religious Zionism</i> 18.3% ($\sum 1-5=42.6\%$)	<i>Secular Zionism</i> 23.4% ($\sum 6-10=47.3\%$)	5.1% bipolarity	28.5%	10.3%	41.7%
<i>In Your Opinion, Are the Jews:</i>	<i>The Chosen People</i> 42.4% ($\sum 1-5=63.7\%$)	<i>One of Many Nations</i> 16.5% ($\sum 6-10=31.8\%$)	25.9% monopolarity	22.6%	4.7%	58.9%

2. Some Methodological and Procedural Findings in the Social Divides Analysis

Finding 1:

Thus, we have three bipolar dichotomies.

To standardize the procedure for assessing the risks of a bipolar dichotomy escalating into destabilizing social divides, we attempted to develop a formula for calculating the risk potential of a divide based on two characteristics: the polarization coefficient and the emotional charge of the topic.

To account for these factors, we propose the following formula: $(V1 + V10) * (1 - |V1 - V10|/\max(V1, V10))$

Where: V1 and V10 – the values (as proportions) of option 1 and option 10, respectively; $|V1 - V10|$ – the absolute difference between these values;

$\max(V1, V10)$ – the largest of the two values, V1 or V10.

$(1 - |V1 - V10|/\max(V1, V10))$ – the asymmetry coefficient that normalizes this difference relative to the larger of the two groups, i.e., it converts the difference into a proportional form instead of treating it as an absolute value.⁷ The higher the index value, the higher the level of polarization

² Values of ratings characterizing radical positions (1 and 10)

³ $\sum 1-5$ - sum of values for options 1-5; $\sum 6-10$ - sum of values for options 6-10

⁴ Polarization coefficient – the difference between the values of radical responses

⁵ Sum of ratings 4-7

⁶ Sum of radical positions (1 and 10)

⁷ By subtracting the relative difference from one, we obtain a measure of how close the groups are to each other:

- If the groups are nearly equal in size (for example, the difference ≈ 0), the result will be close to 1.
- If one group is much larger than the other (the difference ≈ 1), the result will be close to 0.

Thus, the closer the groups are in size, the higher the coefficient (closer to 1), and the stronger the tension between the groups is felt. If one position dominates, the coefficient approaches 0, and polarization is considered lower.

Let us calculate this index for each dichotomy:

1. "Halakhic State vs Secular State": $(15.3 + 18.5) * (1 - |15.3 - 18.5| / 18.5) = 33.8 * 0.83 = 28.1$
2. "One State, Two Peoples vs Two States, Two Peoples": $(21.4 + 18.6) * (1 - |21.4 - 18.6| / 21.4) = 40 * 0.87 = 34.8$ – **the highest conflict potential.**
3. "Religious Zionism vs Secular Zionism": $(18.3 + 23.4) * (1 - |18.3 - 23.4| / 23.4) = 41.7 * 0.78 = 32.5$ – **the highest conflict potential.**

Our logical conclusions align with the results of mathematical calculations, showing that the dichotomies "Religious Zionism vs Secular Zionism" and "One State, Two Peoples vs Two States, Two Peoples" have the highest risk potential. This gives grounds for further testing the applicability of this formula for predicting and assessing the risks of social divides.

Finding 2:

In the process of data analysis, we used another variable – **Overall Support for a Position**, which is the sum of the values of all responses characterizing different degrees of support for a position.

It less characterizes divides, as it includes moderate assessments that indicate a willingness for dialogue, but it provides a good indication of the **consolidating potential of a position**. If more than 60% of respondents support it, the potential is high; if 40-60% support it, the potential is medium; and if less than 40% support it, the potential is low. However, this assessment does not account for the degree of support.

To compare the consolidating potential of each position, accounting for the degree of support, we assigned weights to each assessment and calculated **the Weighted Support Coefficient (WSC)**: The most radical assessments (1 or 10) have the maximum weight, equal to 1; The least radical assessments (5 and 6) have the minimum weight, equal to 0.2. Other weights are distributed between these extremes: Assessment 2 or 9 – 0.8; Assessment 3 or 8 – 0.6; Assessment 4 or 7 – 0.4; Assessment 5 or 6 – 0.2.

WSC = $(V1 \times 1.0 + V2 \times 0.8 + V3 \times 0.6 + V4 \times 0.4 + V5 \times 0.2)$, where V represents the proportion of responses for each assessment.




Diagram 3

Thus, **the positions with the highest consolidation potential are:**

- *The chosenness of the Jewish people;*
- *The uniqueness of the global mission of the state of Israel;*
- *Israel's orientation towards the Collective West.*

3. What else can the results of the study show: Cross-analysis results

Overall, the positions of Israelis regarding various aspects of Israel's status are quite heterogeneous. Answers to questions that involve choosing from polar positions show that, in some cases, there

is no polarization as such, and at the same time, the absence of polarization does not always mean unity of views, but often their amorphousness. In some cases, high radicalization coexists with a similar degree of expressed moderate views. And the presence of high polarization and conflict in a dichotomy can simultaneously coexist with a high consolidating potential of one of its poles.

Given the risk potential of a divide in the dichotomy "Model of Israel's political structure: one state - two peoples / two states – two peoples", we created cross-tabulations based on the ethnic-national identity of respondents who hold radical positions on this issue and found:

The position **"Two states - two peoples"** is more popular among Arabs (especially Arab Christians – 40%), somewhat less so among Druze, and much less popular among Jews (15.5%), who are in opposition to Arab Christians on this issue. Among the radical proponents of the **"One state – two peoples"** position, there is no distinct division between Arabs and Jews. **Jews lead this group** (22.2%), but Arab Muslims have a slightly smaller share (18.6%) of similar radical choices. Nonetheless, in this issue, **Arab Christians are in opposition to Jews**, selecting this position less frequently than others (10%).

The analysis showed a statistically significant influence of ethnic-national identity ($p < .001$) on the choice of extreme position regarding the model of the Israeli state's structure.

Table 8.1. Preferred model of Israel's structure / radical positions / national identity

	Jew	Arab – Muslim	Arab – Christian	Druze
Radical position: One state, two peoples (%)	22.2	18.6	10%	15.4
Radical position: Two states, two peoples (%)	15.5	36.3	40%	26.9
Moderate positions (options 4-7) (%)	30.8	19.5	25	34.6
Color differentiation	Lowest values		Highest values	




Diagram 4

There is an interesting statistically significant difference ($p < .05$) in respondents' preferences for the model of state structure **depending on their area of residence**. The most radical views are found in **Jerusalem**. Compared to other areas, **residents of Jerusalem demonstrate the highest support for the radical position "One state - two peoples"** (74.1% vs. 60.1% on average in other areas) **and the weakest support for "Two states - two peoples"** (25.9% vs. 39.9% on average in other areas), also showing the highest level of agreement on this issue.

The views of Jerusalem residents are most opposed to those of residents in the Central region, who less frequently support the "One state - two peoples" model and more often support the "Two states - two peoples" model.

The Central region of Israel is characterized by the most conflict-driven polarization of responses, with around 50% of residents supporting each position.

In both cases, moderate views are more prevalent among the residents of the Sharon and Southern regions.

Table 8.2 – Preferred Post-War Political Structure Model of Israel (Radical Positions): Two States - Two Peoples vs. One State - One People

		Jerusalem	Center	North	South	Sharon
One State - Two Peoples	Number (n)	20	50	47	57	13
	Area of Residence(%)	74.1	47.6	57.3	67.1	68.4
Two States - Two Peoples	Number (n)	7	55	35	28	6
	Area of Residence(%)	25.9	52.4	42.7	32.9	31.6
	<i>Color Differentiation</i>	<i>Lowest values</i>	<i>Highest values</i>		<i>Medium values</i>	




Diagram 5.

Despite the statistical significance of the relationship between the indicated parameters, the explained variance in responses to these variables is relatively small. According to the results of the regression analysis, the Nagelkerke R^2 coefficient of 0.09 indicates that ethnicity, gender, and area of residence together explain about **9%** of the total variation in responses.

4. Divide or Divides: Let's Look at the Roots

Let us remind you that 6 dichotomies were analyzed based on different parameters.

Further work with the obtained data focused on examining the interrelationships between the 12 radical positions that make up these 6 dichotomies.

Initially, factor analysis was applied, which allowed us to identify hidden, latent factors underlying the processes under study. This method grouped the 12 original variables into 5 content-homogeneous groups based on the principle of maximum affinity among them, explaining a total of 67.979% of the variance. In other words, this explains why we received the distribution of responses we did.

The first component makes the greatest contribution to explaining the total variance, followed by the other components in decreasing order of contribution.

Table 9. - Total Variance Explained

Component	Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings/	
	% of Variance	Cumulative %
Factor 1	19.874	19.874
Factor 2	15.888	35.762
Factor 3	11.959	47.721
Factor 4	10.579	58.299
Factor 5	9.680	67.979

What else, apart from the identified latent factors, determines the difference in position ratings?

Based on the results of the regression analysis, we tested the relationship between the identified factors and socio-demographic characteristics (age, gender, degree of religiosity, nationality, place of residence).

The results of the regression analysis showed the following:

Factor 1 is strongly positively influenced by the *respondent's degree of non/religiosity* ($\beta = .539$, $p < .001$). Age ($\beta = -.058$, $p < .05$) and gender ($\beta = .064$, $p < .05$) have a small effect.

Factor 2 is moderately influenced by the respondent's *degree of non/religiosity* ($\beta = -.339$, $p < .001$) and weakly by age ($\beta = .156$, $p < .001$).

Factor 3 is weakly influenced by non/religiosity ($\beta = -.121$, $p < .001$) and very weakly by age ($\beta = .094$, $p < .01$).

Factor 4 is weakly influenced by gender ($\beta = .109$, $p < .01$) and religiosity ($\beta = -.117$, $p < .001$).

Factor 5 is weakly influenced by nationality ($\beta = .106$, $p < .01$) and very weakly by non/religiosity ($\beta = -.073$).

The regression analysis showed that **the degree of non/religiosity is a significant predictor for all five factors**, although with varying strength and direction of the relationship, while other demographic characteristics mainly have weaker and more selective effects. The strongest relationships were found with the first and second factors.

Age is significantly related to the first three factors, but most strongly with the second.

Gender appeared as a significant predictor only for the first and fourth factors.


National identity is significantly related only to the fifth factor.

Place of residence did not show significant relationships with any of the factors.

When analyzing the factor analysis data, we focused on those latent factors where there are several variables with high loadings (>0.5). Based on this criterion, factors 3-5 were less reliable for interpretation, as they contain individual high loadings, have weak correlations (as will be seen in the subsequent correlation analysis), and show an unstable structure of relationships. The more reliable factors are 1 and 2, which we will subject to further analysis. (See Table 10, which presents the relationships (loadings) between variables and components - latent factors. The closer the loading value is to ± 1 , the stronger the relationship between the variable and the component. Positive and negative signs indicate the direction of the relationship.)

Table 10. - Matrix of Components

	1 factor	2 factor	3 factor	4 factor	5 factor
Jews are the Chosen People	.720	.347	-.057	.097	-.092
Religious Zionism	.638	.385	.215	-.219	-.058
Secular State	-.613	.489	-.146	.135	.064
One of the Ancient Peoples	-.587	.330	.274	-.103	.221
Has a Unique Mission	.562	.497	-.076	.330	-.042
Halakhic State	.548	.411	.260	-.221	-.175
Secular Zionism	-.516	.419	-.395	.276	-.011
Orientation towards the Collective West	-.199	.577	-.458	-.242	-.115
Orientation towards the Global South	-.141	.193	.609	.514	.315
No Unique Mission	-.399	.255	.280	-.616	.215
One State for Two Peoples	.403	.247	-.174	-.029	.714
Two States for Two Peoples	-.410	.357	.371	.097	-.500



Factor 1 (which we will denote as **religiously focused**) shows high positive loadings on the following variables:

"Jews are the Chosen People", "Religious Zionism", "Unique Mission" and "Halakhic State". It also shows high negative loadings on the oppositional variables: "Secular State", "Jews are one of the ancient peoples", "Israel has no unique mission" and "Secular Zionism".

Factor 2 (which we will denote as **secular-modernist**) has medium loadings on the significant variables: "Secular State", "Orientation towards the Collective West", and also, as in the first factor: "Unique Mission of Israel".

The presence of a significant connection with the position of Israel's unique mission in both the first and second hidden factors led us to hypothesize that the uniqueness of Israel's mission is interpreted both in religious and secular terms – a hypothesis that was later tested and not confirmed by correlation analysis (Table 11). For clarity, we have placed only statistically significant correlations that are of medium or near-medium strength in the table, removing any duplicate positions.

Table 11. Correlation analysis data on the interrelationship between the 12 positions

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	11
	One State - Two Nations	Halakhic State	Collective West	No Mission	Chosen People	Religious Zionism	Two States, Two Nations	Secular State	Global South	Один из древ народов
5. Jews as the Chosen People	.289**	.384**								
6. Religious Zionism	.236**	.491**			.463**					
8. Secular State			.323**	.243**			.327**			
9. Orientation towards Global South									—	
10. Unique Mission Exists	.250**	.343**			.546**	.381**				
11. One of the Ancient Peoples				.329**	-.382**		.297**	.363**		
12. Secular Zionism			.301**					.490**		.280**

Note: ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$

Levels of connection strength: 0–.19: Very weak correlation; .2–.39: Weak correlation; .40–.59: Moderate correlation; .6–.79: Strong correlation; .8–1: Very strong correlation.

When reviewing Table 11, it becomes evident that the highest correlation values (ranging from $r = 0.45$ to 0.55) are observed among the following variables: “*Religious Zionism*,” “*Israel’s unique mission in the world*,” “*Halakhic state*,” and “*Jews as the chosen people*,” which collectively define the first hidden factor. All of these variables exhibit the strongest mutual correlations:

- “Jews as the chosen people” vs. “There is a unique mission” ($r = 0.55$)
- “Religious Zionism” vs. “Halakhic State” ($r = 0.49$)
- “Religious Zionism” vs. “Jews as the chosen people” ($r = 0.46$)

An exception is the correlation between “Secular state vs. Secular Zionism” ($r = 0.49$), which also falls within the highest strength range but represents the second group of hidden factors. Other correlations related to this variable show lower strength, but the most significant ones (within the range $r = 0.3$ – 0.35) include:

- “Secular state” - “One of the ancient peoples” ($r = 0.36$)
- “Secular state” - “Two states for two peoples” ($r = 0.33$)
- “Secular state” - “Orientation toward the Collective West” ($r = 0.32$)

Additionally, the variable “Israel’s unique mission,” which was associated with both the first and second hidden factors in the factor analysis, did not confirm its connection to the second (**secular-modernist**) group of variables in the correlation analysis. This finding suggests that the concept of Israel’s mission is perceived primarily in a religious context among Israelis.

Interesting to notice, that it is worth noting that the orientation toward the Global South is generally absent from the system of value-orientational coordinates among Israelis, as evidenced by the lack of statistically significant correlations between this position and any other positions.

As for the dilemma of “*two states for two peoples*” vs. “*one state for two peoples*,” despite the high emotional charge surrounding this issue today, it is unlikely to be nation-formative: the correlations with other model components are too low.

In any case, the position “One state – Two peoples” is clearly associated with the first, religiously oriented group (“Jews as the chosen people,” $r = 0.29$; “Israel has a unique mission in the world,” $r = 0.25$; “orientation toward religious Zionism,” $r = 0.24$). Meanwhile, the position “Two states – Two peoples” is clearly associated with the second (secular-modernist) group (“Secular state,” $r = 0.33$, and “Jews are one of the ancient peoples of the Earth,” $r = 0.3$).

The analysis of nation-formative concepts of the Jewish state, with “Jews as the chosen people” occupying a central place, raises the fundamental question of the potential for other nations, particularly Arabs, to identify with the Jewish state.

5. *Israel Today: Politics of Peace / Discord*

The analysis of dichotomies has revealed that contemporary Israel is rife with contradictions. **How do politicians deal with this issue?**

The majority of respondents (40%) believe that none of the politicians listed in the survey contribute to unifying Israeli society. However, among those seen as fostering unity, a statistically significant portion of responses recognize contributions from **Benjamin Netanyahu** (19.6%) and Benny Gantz (13.3%). Conversely, three politicians are seen as significantly contributing to societal division and conflict in Israel: primarily Yair Lapid (28.2%), followed by **Benjamin Netanyahu** (23.3%), and **Itamar Ben-Gvir** (20.8%).

The contradictory assessments of **Benjamin Netanyahu** are particularly noteworthy—he ranks among the leaders both in promoting societal unity and in causing division within Israeli society. It seems that his persona as a political figure is itself a source of one of the divisions within Israeli society.

In this range of evaluations, Yair Lapid stands out as the most “consensually” negative figure.

Table 12: - Which Politician Currently Contributes the Most:

		Contributing to Unification of Israeli Society		Contributing to Division and Conflict in Israeli Society	
		Frequency	Valid Percent	Frequency	Valid Percent
Valid	Benjamin Netanyahu	197	19.6	234	23.3
	Benny Gantz	134	13.3	29	2.9
	Yair Lapid	57	5.7	283	28.2
	Avigdor Lieberman	28	2.8	24	2.4
	Itamar Ben-Gvir	45	4.5	209	20.8
	Aryeh Deri	17	1.7	6	.6
	Bezael Smotrich	16	1.6	40	4.0
	None of them	406	40.4	69	6.9
	Don't know	105	10.4	111	11.0
	Total	1005	100	1005	100


6. External Influences: The Collective West, Global South, and U.S. Elections

The majority of Israelis, to varying degrees, believe in the conflict existence between the Collective West and the Global South. Of the respondents, 54.7% chose options indicating they are either "certain" or "think there is such a conflict," with 16% expressing complete certainty. Conversely, only a combined 10.7% lean towards the answer "there is no such conflict," while over a third (34.6%) were uncertain about how to answer this question.

The significant number of Israelis uncertain about this issue, in contrast to the essentially singular prevailing perspective, suggests that this topic is not yet dominant in public discourse. However, for those who actively follow the topic, the answer appears relatively clear-cut. It seems, therefore, that this issue is beginning to establish its place within Israel's public and informational space.

Table 13 - Is there a conflict between the Collective West and the Global South?

		Frequency	Valid Percent
Valid	Certain Yes	164	16.3
	Think Yes	386	38.4
	Think No	87	8.7
	Certain No	20	2
	Don't Know	348	34.6
Total		1005	100



And on the question of a connection between the Russia-Ukraine conflict and the standoff between the Collective West and the Global South, public opinion also leans towards the existence of such a connection.

17.6% of respondents stated that they are certain it exists (compared to 4% who strongly disagree), along with an additional 42.4% who consider it plausible that this confrontation has some influence on the Russia-Ukraine conflict.

The total of those somewhat or fully convinced of this connection is approximately 70%, compared to 20% who, to varying degrees, are convinced there is no such link.

However, given the relatively low share of strongly polarized opinions (21.5% — indicating low emotional intensity on this issue) and a low proportion of respondents who were uncertain on the matter (suggesting adequate awareness of the topic), **it appears that this subject is not only absent from the sphere of public division but is also not a significant focus within public discourse.**

Table 14 - Is there a connection or no connection between the Russia-Ukraine conflict and the confrontation between the Collective West and the Global South?

1 No connection at all		2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10 Strong connection	Don't know
Frequency (n)	22	11	21	27	39	72	95	90	31	97	45
Valid Percent (%)	4	2	3.8	4.9	7.1	13.1	17.3	16.4	5.6	17.6	8.2
Moderate position (%)				42.4							
Total (n)	550										
Missing System n, %	455(45.3)										

Compared to the previous question, the values characterizing the emotional charge of the topic (19%) regarding the connection between the Israel-Hamas and Hezbollah war are even lower. Radical supporters of the existence of such a connection are only 11%, while those who believe it does not exist make up 8%. There are fewer supporters of a moderate position (36.5%), but the proportion of those who could not answer this question is 2.5 times higher. Approximately 42% are convinced, to varying degrees, that there is a connection between **the Israel-Hamas and Hezbollah war and the conflict between the Collective West and the Global South**, compared to 37% who, to varying degrees, are convinced that no such connection exists.

Table 15 – Is there a connection or no connection between the Israel-Hamas and Hezbollah war and the conflict between the Collective West and the Global South?

1 No connection at all		2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10 Strong connection	Don't know
Frequency (n)	80	33	81	87	85	99	94	86	29	111	220
Valid Percent (%)	8	3.3	8.1	8.7	8.5	9.9	9.4	8.6	2.9	11	21.9
Moderate position (%)				36.5							

An even lower level of interest among Israelis is observed regarding the topic of the upcoming U.S. presidential election's influence on the course of the Israel-Hamas and Hezbollah war: the emotional charge of the topic is 22.3%. The proportion of those who firmly believe in the existence of such a connection is 14%, while those who **oppose this idea amount to 8.3%**. Overall, the number of Israelis, to varying degrees, who acknowledge such an influence (answers 6-10) is 47% (compared to 42% who hold the opposite view).

Table 16 – Is there a connection or no connection between the course of the Israel-Hamas and Hezbollah war and the political struggle in the U.S. presidential elections?

1 No connection at all		2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10 Strong connection	Don't know
Frequency (n)	83	37	89	119	91	105	113	83	39	141	105
Valid Percent (%)	8.3	3.7	8.9	11.8	9.1	10.4	11.2	8.3	3.9	14	10.4
Moderate position (%)				42.5							

7. *Israel Between the East and the West*

Despite the lack of a perception among Israelis of Israel's orientation towards the Global South, with a prevailing orientation towards the Collective West, **about 40% of respondents are convinced, to some extent, that Israel will be able to become a country that connects the interests of the Collective West and the Global South in the future.** This, at the very least, suggests the absence of a negative attitude towards this direction of foreign policy. Respondents who are somewhat convinced of the opposite position make up 10% fewer, around 30%. The same proportion of people were unable to answer this question. This primarily indicates the absence of an active public discourse on this topic.

Table 17. - Will Israel be able to become a country in the future that connects the interests of the Collective West and the Global South?				Table 18. - Is there currently a political force in Israel capable of turning the State of Israel into a country that connects the interests of the Collective West and the Global South?			
		Frequency	Valid Percent			Frequency	Valid Percent
Valid	Certain Yes	56	5.6	Valid	Certain Yes	52	5.2
	Think Yes	337	33.5		Think Yes	246	24.5
	Think No	250	24.9		Think No	299	29.8
	Certain No	60	6		Certain No	114	11.3
	Don't Know	302	30		Don't Know	294	29.3
	Total	1005	100		Total	1005	100

A smaller percentage of respondents (about 30%) believe that there is a political force in today's Israel capable of turning the State of Israel into a country that connects the interests of the Collective West and the Global South, compared to those who are convinced that Israel can become such a country in the future (about 40%). This suggests that the current internal political situation does not foster movement in this direction. The percentage of answers indicating the absence of such a political force (40%) exceeds the percentage of those who believe such a political force exists (30%). Therefore, at present, such a prospect seems unlikely in the eyes of most Israelis.

Conclusions

The data obtained through the analysis show that some of the narratives are conflict-driven, marked by high emotional charge in the dichotomies, alongside a high degree of polarization.

1. Radical Views: In the dichotomies studied, 30% to 60% of responses reflect radical viewpoints.
2. Most Emotionally Charged Dichotomies:
 - **"Jews are the chosen people" vs "One of many ancient peoples"**
 - "Israel has a unique mission in the world" vs "Israel has no unique mission"
 - Preferred ideology: "Religious Zionism" vs "Secular Zionism"
 - Preferred model for post-war statehood in Israel: "One state – two peoples" vs "Two states – two peoples"

2. Narratives about the Chosenness of the Jewish People and Israel's Unique Mission: These narratives serve as the consensual foundation of Israeli society.

40% of Israelis are **firmly convinced** that Israel has a unique global mission, and 42% are **firmly certain** that Jews are the chosen people. Only a small proportion of respondents hold opposite extreme views.

3. Currently, the dichotomies "Religious Zionism" vs "Secular Zionism" and "One state - two peoples" vs "Two states - two peoples" have the highest risks of becoming an instrument of splitting Israeli society. They are among the highly emotionally charged dichotomies with a simultaneous pronounced degree of position polarization.

4. **Israelis are more inclined to the view that Israel is primarily a secular state.** Radical positions on this issue account for a total of 34% of respondents, though moderate views prevail (41.5%).

5. Characterizing the preferred model of the post-war structure "1 state - 2 peoples" VS "2 states - 2 peoples," almost 40% of respondents adhere to the most extreme positions (approximately equally on each side), which reflects a high degree of polarization, which is enhanced by a significantly lower number of supporters of a moderate position (27.2%).

6. **According to ethno-national characteristics, the main division in relation to the preferred model of the structure of the state of Israel is the position of "2 states of 2 peoples" between the Jewish sector and Christian Arabs,** demonstrating the most polar trends in relation to these two positions. But there is a more significant difference in the position of **"2 states 2 peoples," which Christian Arabs mark 4 times more often (40%) compared to Jews (15.5%), for whom it is the least preferred.**

7. Jerusalem stands out for its extreme positions on this issue, **showing higher support for the position "One state for two peoples" (74.1% compared to 60.1% on average in other regions)** and significantly lower support for the idea of "Two states for two peoples" (**25.9% vs 39.9% in other cities**). **Both of these positions are most opposed by residents of the Center and North. The most neutral positions are held by residents of the Sharon and South regions.**

8. **Politically and economically, Israel is predominantly seen by Israelis as a pro-Western country.** Almost one-third of respondents hold this view categorically, with only 2% opposing this orientation. A significant proportion of respondents (35%) maintain a moderate position.

9. The views expressed by Israelis form two main clusters of worldviews: the religiously-oriented and the secular-modernist clusters. Each represents a coherent system of views on various aspects of life, demonstrating internal consistency and antagonistic relationships between the two.

The basis for these clusters lies primarily in the religious worldview, which seemingly most significantly influences practices and decisions, even those not directly related to religious life. Religiously-Oriented Cluster includes components such as Halakhic state, religious Zionism, the chosenness of the Jewish people, and Israel's unique mission in the world.

Its antagonistic secular-modernist cluster is the second most important, although somewhat weaker than the first, and it consists of components: a secular state, secular Zionism and orientation towards the Collective West.

Thus, the non/religiosity factor is a key predictor for all identified factors, while other demographic characteristics have a more selective influence.

10. The position "One State – Two Peoples" is clearly linked to the religiously-oriented group, while "Two States – Two Peoples" is associated with the secular-modernist group.

11. The orientation toward the Global South is not part of the value-oriented coordinates of Israelis, as evidenced by the lack of statistically significant connections with other positions.

12. *Despite the high emotional charge surrounding in the current situation the dilemma "Two States for Two Peoples" vs "One State for Two Peoples" does not seem to be a nation-forming issue, as its correlation with other components of the model is very low.*

13. The analysis of the nation-forming concepts of the Jewish state, among which the key place is given to the God-elect of the Jewish people, raises the question of the fundamental possibilities of other nations, primarily Arabs, to identify with the Jewish state.

14. Despite of the contradictory and tense of the situation:

- 40% of Israelis believe that none of the current political leaders contribute to the unification of Israeli society.
- 19.6% believe that Benjamin Netanyahu contributes to the unification, while 13.3% say the same about Benny Gantz.
- Yair Lapid (28.2%), Benjamin Netanyahu (23.3%), and Itamar Ben-Gvir (20.8%) are seen as contributing to the division of Israeli society.
- Benjamin Netanyahu's political persona is at the heart of one of the divides in Israeli society.
- The most solidary negative assessment is for Yair Lapid.

15. External Influences – Collective West, Global South, U.S. Elections:

- 38.4% of Israelis believe in the existence of a conflict **between the Collective West and the Global South**, with less than 10% disagreeing.
- Around 70% are convinced of some form of connection **between the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and the conflict between the Collective West and the Global South**, while 20% believe the opposite.
- Around 42% see a connection **between the Israel-Hamas-Hezbollah conflict and the Collective West-Global South conflict**, with 37% disagreeing.

To varying degrees, 47% are convinced of the connection **between Israel's war with Hamas and Hezbollah** and the conflict between the collective West and the Global South against \approx 41% of whose to varying degrees convinced of the lack of such a connection.

16. Israel Between East and West: Despite the lack of emphasis on the orientation toward the Global South and a prevailing pro-Western orientation, **39% of Israelis believe that Israel may, in the future, become a country that unites the interests of the Collective West and the Global South.** However, the majority of Israelis believe that no current political force in Israel is capable of achieving this.

17. Methodologically the study demonstrated the effectiveness of assessing the conflict potential of dichotomies based on the degree of emotional charge and the polarization coefficient.

18. Prospective Research Directions:

1. Consolidating narratives of the Jewish state and non-jewish populations in Israel: integration or deepening divides?
2. Consolidating narratives of the Jewish state in the context of international relations.
3. Politics of social integration and schisms
4. Monitoring of social divisions: the degree of social radicalization analyses and its connection with key indicators of social well-being (social trust, social optimism, cohesion, control over the situation, planning horizon).
5. Tools for reducing social contradictions: the potential of territorial public self-governance.