



Arab-Israeli Conflict

Israeli Public Opinion

June 2025

Survey Methodology: This study was based on a nationally representative online survey of 1,006 Israeli adults, conducted in mid-June 2025. The sample included both Jewish and Arab citizens aged 18 and older. The margin of error is ± 3.1 percentage points at the 95% confidence level.

The survey was fielded by the Geocartography Center using a questionnaire developed by the Dor Moria Analytical Center.

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Root Causes of the Conflict

When asked about the primary driver of the Arab-Israeli conflict, Israelis are divided between two main explanations: **an existential clash between Judaism and Islam (31.7%)** and **territorial disputes over land (28.7%)**.


Religious Israelis are far more likely to frame the conflict in religious terms—seeing it as rooted in the biblical story of Abraham and his sons—while secular respondents tend to view it as a territorial and historical dispute.

Jewish Israelis are three times as likely as Arab citizens to characterize this as an **existential religious conflict**, while **Arab respondents** are nearly three times as likely to describe it as stemming from **political and economic factors**.

Q1. What do you see as the main cause of the Arab-Israeli conflict?


Response	Overall	Secular	Traditional	Ultra-Orthodox	Jewish	Arab
Existential clash between Judaism and Islam	31.7%	30.1%	38.5%	45.0%	35.7%	10.6%
Territorial dispute over land	28.7%	34.1%	25.5%	16.2%	27.9%	33.1%
Political-economic conflict driven by competing interests	13.7%	11.5%	10.4%	9.4%	10.8%	29.4%
Divine conflict rooted in Abraham's legacy	11.3%	7.8%	13.3%	23.1%	12.5%	5.0%
Historical conflict from colonial legacy/British Mandate	9.0%	11.5%	6.5%	3.8%	8.4%	12.5%
Other	5.5%	4.9%	5.8%	2.5%	4.7%	9.4%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
(N=1,006)	(N=408)	(N=278)	(N=160)	(N=846)	(N=160)	

What do you think is the main factor in the Arab-Israeli conflict?




- This is an existential conflict between Judaism and Islam
- This is a territorial conflict - a struggle for land
- This conflict stems from the political and economic interests of various actors
- This is a conflict based on a divine plan - it is rooted in the story of Abraham and his sons
- This is a historical conflict - a consequence of the British Mandate and the struggle for power

What do you think is the main factor in the Arab-Israeli conflict?



What do you think is the main factor in the Arab-Israeli conflict?




External Players in the Conflict


Iran stands out as the country most Israelis blame for escalating tensions since October 7, 2023. Over half of all respondents (54.5%) point to Iran, though there's a sharp divide: 60% of Jewish Israelis versus just 24% of Arab citizens. Arab respondents are far more likely to blame the United States (19% compared to less than 1% of Jewish respondents).

Few respondents see other major powers—including Qatar, Russia, France, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, China, or the UK—as primary instigators (each drawing 1-5% support).

Q2. Which country has done the most to escalate the Arab-Israeli conflict since October 7, 2023?

Country	Overall	Jewish	Arab
Iran	54.5%	60.3%	23.7%
Turkey	8.3%	8.9%	5.6%
Qatar	4.9%	5.7%	0.6%
United States	3.9%	0.9%	19.4%
Russia	3.6%	4.0%	1.3%
Other countries	<2% each		
Unsure	16.2%	13.8%	28.7%
No country	2.7%	1.1%	11.2%





Policy Preferences: Annexation vs. Palestinian State

On a seven-point scale measuring support for Israeli policy toward the West Bank and Gaza—from complete annexation (1) to creating a Palestinian state (7)—**nearly one-third of Israelis (30.8%) favor full annexation**, making it the single most popular position. Only 9.5% support the opposite extreme of Palestinian statehood, while 17.4% take the middle ground.

Q3. Where do you stand on Israeli policy toward the West Bank and Gaza? (Scale: 1=Complete annexation to 7=Palestinian state)


1 - Complete annexation	2	3	4	5	6	7 - Palestinian state
30.8%	13.9%	11.7%	17.4%	9.8%	6.8%	9.5%

Q3.1 Support for Annexation by Religious Observance


Group	Complete annexation	2	3	4	5	6	Palestinian state
Secular	23.3%	14.5%	15.7%	18.1%	14.5%	7.6%	6.4%
Traditional	38.8%	14.0%	14.0%	19.1%	6.5%	5.8%	1.8%
Ultra-Orthodox	56.9%	20.0%	3.8%	11.2%	4.4%	2.5%	1.3%

Q3.2 Support for Annexation by Population Group


Group	Complete annexation	2	3	4	5	6	Palestinian state
Jewish	34.8%	15.4%	12.9%	17.1%	9.9%	6.0%	3.9%
Arab	10.0%	6.3%	5.6%	18.8%	9.4%	10.6%	39.4%



Support for annexation rises sharply with religious observance, from 23.3% among secular Israelis to 56.9 % among the ultra-Orthodox.



Jewish Israelis are nearly four times as likely as Arab citizens to support complete annexation (34.8% vs. 10%), while Arab Israelis are ten times more likely to favor Palestinian statehood (39.4% vs. 3.9%).




Skepticism About Annexation as Solution


Most Israelis doubt that annexation would resolve the conflict. **Just over half (52%) believe that full Israeli annexation of UN-designated Palestinian territories would fail to settle disputes over Jerusalem, the West Bank, and Gaza**, while only 24% think it might work. Nearly a quarter (23.6%) are unsure.

Q4. Could complete Israeli annexation of Palestinian territories resolve territorial disputes?


Response	Overall	Secular	Traditional	Ultra-Orthodox	Jewish	Arab
Definitely yes	10.9%	7.1%	12.2%	24.4%	12.1%	5.0%
Probably yes	13.5%	14.0%	15.1%	13.8%	14.3%	9.4%
Probably no	22.5%	27.0%	18.7%	16.9%	22.3%	23.1%
Definitely no	29.5%	30.4%	27.0%	25.0%	28.3%	36.3%
Unsure	23.6%	21.6%	27.0%	20.0%	23.0%	26.2%



Support for annexation rises from 21% among secular Israelis to 38% among religious respondents, while secular Israelis are significantly more likely to reject it as a viable solution (57% vs. 42%).



Both Jewish and Arab Israelis are predominantly skeptical that annexation would resolve disputes (59.4 % and 50.6% respectively), though Jewish respondents are somewhat more open to annexation as a potential solution (26.4% vs. 14.4% of Arab citizens).



Prospects for Peaceful Coexistence


Most Israelis (62%) believe lasting peace between Jews and Palestinians would be impossible if Israel annexes the territories, with only 20% seeing coexistence as viable under annexation. However, Israelis are also pessimistic about peace prospects without annexation: just 22.6% think peaceful coexistence is possible without territorial changes, while 55.6% see it as unachievable either way.

Q5. Is peaceful coexistence possible with annexation?

Response	Overall	Secular	Traditional	Ultra-Orthodox	Jewish	Arab
Definitely yes	4.5%	2.9%	3.6%	6.9%	3.9%	7.5%
Probably yes	15.7%	17.2%	15.1%	11.9%	15.5%	16.9%
Probably no	25.1%	27.9%	25.9%	20.0%	25.8%	21.9%
Definitely no	36.9%	35.3%	39.6%	46.3%	38.8%	26.9%
Unsure	17.8%	16.7%	15.8%	15.0%	16.1%	26.9%

Jewish and Arab Israelis show roughly similar levels of belief in peaceful coexistence under annexation (**around 20% in each group**). However, Jewish respondents are more likely to rule it out entirely (**64.6% vs. 48.8% of Arab citizens**), while Arab respondents are more often unsure (**26.9% vs. 16.1%**).

Share of 'No' Answers to Peaceful Coexistence after Annexation




Q6. Is peaceful coexistence possible without annexation?

Response	Overall	Secular	Traditional	Ultra-Orthodox	Jewish	Arab
Definitely yes	3.9%	2.7%	1.8%	1.9%	2.2%	12.5%
Probably yes	18.7%	23.0%	14.4%	7.5%	17.3%	26.2%
Probably no	22.5%	25.5%	23.0%	16.9%	23.0%	19.4%
Definitely no	33.1%	27.2%	41.0%	54.4%	36.9%	13.1%
Unsure	21.9%	21.6%	19.8%	19.4%	20.6%	28.7%

Arab Israelis are twice as likely as Jewish citizens to believe peaceful coexistence is possible without annexation (38.7% vs. 19.5%), and far less likely to rule it out entirely (32.5% vs. 60%).

Belief in Peaceful Coexistence WITHOUT Annexation



Expected Impact on Israeli Society


Four in ten Israelis (40.7%) expect annexation would damage Israeli society, with secular and Arab respondents particularly concerned. Only 23% anticipate positive effects—half as many as those predicting harm.

Q7. How would annexation affect Israeli society?

Response	Overall	Secular	Traditional	Ultra-Orthodox	Jewish	Arab
Positive impact	23.0%	19.9%	25.5%	43.1%	26.1%	6.3%
Negative impact	40.7%	49.0%	35.3%	20.6%	39.1%	48.8%
No major impact	12.2%	10.3%	14.0%	13.8%	12.2%	12.5%
Unsure	24.2%	20.8%	25.2%	22.5%	22.6%	32.5%

Ultra-Orthodox respondents are most optimistic about annexation's impact on society (43.1% positive vs. 20.6% negative), while secular Israelis are most pessimistic (19.9% positive vs. 49.0% negative).

How will Israel's annexation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip impact the internal situation in Israeli society?



Political Continuity


Israelis are split on whether an opposition government would continue Netanyahu's approach to Palestinian statehood. Three in ten (31%) expect policy continuity, with just 7.8% certain of this outcome. A larger share (44%) believes the opposition would change course, including 18.4% who are confident of a policy shift.

Secular Israelis are more inclined to expect continuity (27.5% vs. 15.6% of ultra-Orthodox respondents).

Q8. Would an opposition government continue Netanyahu's policy of preventing Palestinian statehood?

Response	Overall	Secular	Traditional	Ultra-Orthodox	Jewish	Arab
Definitely yes	7.8%	7.6%	8.3%	7.5%	7.8%	7.5%
Probably yes	23.2%	27.5%	23.7%	15.6%	24.0%	18.8%
Probably no	24.8%	26.7%	20.5%	27.5%	24.8%	24.4%
Definitely no	18.4%	15.0%	22.3%	25.0%	19.3%	13.8%
Unsure	25.9%	23.3%	25.2%	24.4%	24.1%	35.6%

If the opposition wins the elections, will it continue Netanyahu's policy of preventing the creation of a Palestinian state?



Electoral Implications

Israelis are divided over whether annexation will become a major campaign issue. **Just under half (42.8%) expect the annexation debate to feature prominently in the next election**, while 34.2% doubt it will be central to campaigns. Nearly a quarter (23%) are unsure.

Q9. Will annexation be a central issue in the next election?

Response	Overall	Secular	Traditional	Ultra-Orthodox	Jewish	Arab
Definitely yes	11.1%	14.0%	9.4%	9.4%	11.6%	8.7%
Probably yes	31.7%	33.8%	31.7%	26.9%	31.8%	31.3%
Probably no	27.1%	27.9%	29.1%	28.7%	28.5%	20.0%
Definitely no	7.1%	7.8%	6.5%	8.1%	7.4%	5.0%
Unsure	23.0%	16.4%	23.4%	26.9%	20.7%	35.0%

Secular respondents are most confident that annexation will become an electoral issue (47.8% say it definitely or probably will), compared to 36.3% of ultra-Orthodox respondents. Arab citizens show the highest uncertainty on this question (35% unsure).

