Global connections
Research & archive
The nationwide survey “Public attitudes to the threshold of tolerance for international isolation” was fielded in mid-August 2026. Published November 4, 2026.
Key findings
25.5%
Think serious damage is already occurring
23.7%
Think pressure can be endured indefinitely
30.8%
See no strategic alternative to the U.S.
N = 1003
Respondents in the full sample
Methodology
A nationwide online survey was conducted in mid-August 2026 among 1,003 Israeli internet users aged 18 and over. The sample represented this population; Jewish and Arab respondents were included proportionally. The report gives a maximum margin of error of ±3.1 percentage points at 95% confidence for the overall sample. Sample sizes and totals are shown as supplied; subgroup estimates have greater uncertainty. Publication date: November 4, 2026.
Why international pressure has increased
Government actions and the conduct of the war since October 7, 2023 were the most frequently selected explanation (28.6%). Opponents’ propaganda was named by 22.9%, hostility to Jews independent of Israeli actions by 21.9%, and the long conflict without a political settlement by 15.0%. Government actions were selected by 35.2% of secular, 9.2% of religious and Haredi, and 40.8% of Arab respondents. Hostility to Jews was cited by 38.0% of religious and Haredi respondents and 18.8% of secular respondents.
Why international pressure has increased
Percentages. Full responses and sample bases are in the table.
Full table by respondent group
| Response | Overall | Secular | Traditional | Religious and Haredi | Jewish | Arab |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Israeli government actions and conduct of the war since October 7, 2023 | 28.6% | 35.2% | 24.2% | 9.2% | 26.6% | 40.8% |
| Propaganda by Israel's opponents | 22.9% | 24.9% | 27.0% | 27.0% | 26.0% | 4.2% |
| Hostility to Jews independent of Israel's actions | 21.9% | 18.8% | 26.0% | 38.0% | 24.9% | 4.2% |
| Long conflict without a political settlement, regardless of who is right | 15.0% | 13.9% | 12.1% | 12.3% | 13.0% | 26.8% |
| Other | 1.2% | 0.5% | 1.4% | 3.1% | 1.3% | 0.7% |
| Don't know | 7.0% | 4.6% | 6.6% | 6.1% | 5.6% | 15.5% |
| Disagree that pressure has increased over the past two years | 3.4% | 2.0% | 2.8% | 4.3% | 2.7% | 7.7% |
| Total | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% |
| N | 1003 | 409 | 289 | 163 | 861 | 142 |
Western attitudes and a Palestinian settlement
51.7% thought Western attitudes toward Israel depended strongly or fairly strongly on a political settlement of the Palestinian question; 40.4% gave the two less-dependent answers. The combined dependent share was 60.4% among secular respondents, 47.4% among traditional respondents, 28.8% among religious and Haredi respondents, 50.1% among Jewish respondents and 62.0% among Arab respondents.
Western attitudes and a Palestinian settlement
Percentages. Full responses and sample bases are in the table.
Overall distribution
- Depends very strongly
- 17.4%
- Depends fairly strongly
- 34.3%
- Does not depend much
- 23.7%
- Does not depend at all
- 16.7%
- Don't know
- 7.9%
Full table by respondent group
| Response | Overall | Secular | Traditional | Religious and Haredi | Jewish | Arab |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Depends very strongly | 17.4% | 17.8% | 14.2% | 6.1% | 14.4% | 35.9% |
| Depends fairly strongly | 34.3% | 42.5% | 33.2% | 22.7% | 35.7% | 26.1% |
| Does not depend much | 23.7% | 21.5% | 28.4% | 28.2% | 25.1% | 15.5% |
| Does not depend at all | 16.7% | 11.5% | 17.6% | 35.0% | 18.0% | 8.5% |
| Don't know | 7.9% | 6.6% | 6.6% | 8.0% | 6.9% | 14.1% |
| Total “depends” | 51.7% | 60.4% | 47.4% | 28.8% | 50.1% | 62.0% |
| Total | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% |
| N | 1003 | 409 | 289 | 163 | 861 | 142 |
Experiences of respondents and their families
43.5% reported none of the listed experiences. 35.5% had avoided disclosing they were from Israel, 27.4% reported flight disruptions and 14.4% hostility abroad linked to being Israeli. Visa or entry problems were reported by 4.8%, academic or professional cooperation difficulties by 4.7%, and study difficulties by 4.7%. Several answers were possible. Reporting none of these experiences was more common among religious and Haredi respondents (56.4%) than secular respondents (36.4%).
Experiences of respondents and their families
Percentages. Full responses and sample bases are in the table.
Full table by respondent group
| Response | Overall | Secular | Traditional | Religious and Haredi | Jewish | Arab |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Avoided saying I was from Israel | 35.5% | 45.2% | 33.6% | 17.8% | 36.1% | 31.7% |
| Flight cancellations or reductions that disrupted plans | 27.4% | 33.7% | 25.6% | 21.5% | 28.7% | 19.7% |
| Hostility abroad because I was Israeli | 14.4% | 15.6% | 15.2% | 15.3% | 15.4% | 7.7% |
| Visa or entry refusal, delay or difficulty | 4.8% | 5.4% | 3.1% | 3.7% | 4.3% | 7.7% |
| Refusal or difficulties in scientific or professional cooperation abroad | 4.7% | 5.4% | 3.5% | 2.5% | 4.2% | 7.7% |
| Difficulty studying abroad | 4.7% | 4.4% | 5.5% | 3.7% | 4.6% | 4.9% |
| Loss of a customer, contract or market abroad | 3.7% | 3.9% | 3.8% | 2.5% | 3.6% | 4.2% |
| Neither I nor my family experienced any of these in the past two years | 43.5% | 36.4% | 42.9% | 56.4% | 42.4% | 50.0% |
| Total | 138.6% | 150.1% | 133.2% | 123.3% | 139.4% | 133.8% |
| N | 1003 | 409 | 289 | 163 | 861 | 142 |
Social cohesion
39.5% thought external pressure divides Israeli society, 35.9% thought it unites it, and 24.6% saw no effect. The share seeing division was 44.3% among secular, 38.4% among traditional, and 31.9% among religious and Haredi respondents.
Social cohesion
Percentages. Full responses and sample bases are in the table.
Overall distribution
- Total “unites”
- 35.9%
- No effect on cohesion
- 24.6%
- Total “divides”
- 39.5%
Full table by respondent group
| Response | Overall | Secular | Traditional | Religious and Haredi | Jewish | Arab |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Strongly unites | 7.8% | 5.1% | 8.7% | 9.8% | 7.2% | 11.3% |
| Somewhat unites | 28.1% | 27.4% | 30.8% | 27.0% | 28.5% | 26.1% |
| No effect on cohesion | 24.6% | 23.2% | 22.1% | 31.3% | 24.4% | 26.1% |
| Somewhat divides | 29.1% | 33.0% | 30.4% | 24.5% | 30.5% | 20.4% |
| Strongly divides | 10.4% | 11.2% | 8.0% | 7.4% | 9.4% | 16.2% |
| Total “unites” | 35.9% | 32.5% | 39.4% | 36.8% | 35.7% | 37.3% |
| Total “divides” | 39.5% | 44.3% | 38.4% | 31.9% | 40.0% | 36.6% |
| Total | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% |
| N | 1003 | 409 | 289 | 163 | 861 | 142 |
How long can Israel withstand the pressure?
25.5% thought serious damage was already occurring and 23.7% thought Israel could withstand the pressure indefinitely. The latter answer ranged from 14.4% among secular respondents to 45.4% among religious and Haredi respondents. Serious damage already occurring was selected by 34.5% and 14.7%, respectively. These are assessments of tolerance, not forecasts of economic or security damage.
How long can Israel withstand the pressure?
Percentages. Full responses and sample bases are in the table.
Overall distribution
- Indefinitely
- 23.7%
- Serious damage is already occurring
- 25.5%
By religious identification
| Secular | Traditional | Religious and Haredi | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Indefinitely | Secular14.4% | Traditional27.7% | Religious and Haredi45.4% |
| Serious damage is already occurring | Secular34.5% | Traditional20.1% | Religious and Haredi14.7% |
Full table by respondent group
| Response | Overall | Secular | Traditional | Religious and Haredi | Jewish | Arab |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Indefinitely | 23.7% | 14.4% | 27.7% | 45.4% | 24.7% | 17.6% |
| Five to ten years | 10.3% | 10.8% | 10.4% | 10.4% | 10.6% | 8.5% |
| Two to five years | 12.2% | 14.4% | 13.8% | 5.5% | 12.5% | 9.9% |
| Less than two years | 8.7% | 7.1% | 11.4% | 2.5% | 7.7% | 14.8% |
| Serious damage is already occurring | 25.5% | 34.5% | 20.1% | 14.7% | 25.9% | 23.2% |
| Don't know | 19.6% | 18.8% | 16.6% | 21.5% | 18.6% | 26.1% |
| Total | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% |
| N | 1003 | 409 | 289 | 163 | 861 | 142 |
Alternatives to the United States
30.8% saw no alternative to the United States as Israel's principal strategic partner. India led the named alternatives (20.9%); 20.8% did not know. The EU received 6.7%, Gulf states 5.1%, Japan and South Korea 5.0%, Russia 2.9%, China 2.7% and the United Kingdom 2.6%.
Alternatives to the United States
Percentages. Full responses and sample bases are in the table.
Full table by respondent group
| Response | Overall | Secular | Traditional | Religious and Haredi | Jewish | Arab |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| India | 20.9% | 20.5% | 23.5% | 23.9% | 22.2% | 13.4% |
| European Union | 6.7% | 8.1% | 5.9% | 4.9% | 6.7% | 6.3% |
| Gulf states | 5.1% | 4.9% | 4.8% | 4.3% | 4.8% | 7.0% |
| Japan and South Korea | 5.0% | 4.9% | 6.2% | 5.5% | 5.5% | 2.1% |
| Russia | 2.9% | 2.4% | 2.8% | 1.8% | 2.4% | 5.6% |
| China | 2.7% | 2.7% | 3.1% | 2.5% | 2.8% | 2.1% |
| United Kingdom | 2.6% | 2.9% | 1.0% | 0.6% | 1.9% | 7.0% |
| Other country or group | 2.5% | 2.4% | 2.8% | 3.1% | 2.7% | 1.4% |
| Don't know | 20.8% | 19.6% | 18.3% | 21.5% | 19.5% | 28.9% |
| No country could become an alternative strategic partner | 30.8% | 31.5% | 31.5% | 31.9% | 31.6% | 26.1% |
| Total | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% |
| N | 1003 | 409 | 289 | 163 | 861 | 142 |
Perceptions of American Jewish attitudes
50.0% believed American Jews supported or leaned toward supporting Israel's policies, 15.7% saw opposition, 20.0% neutrality, and 14.3% did not know. Perceived support was 53.0% among Jewish respondents and 32.4% among Arab respondents. These figures describe Israeli respondents’ perceptions, not a poll of American Jews.
Perceptions of American Jewish attitudes
Percentages. Full responses and sample bases are in the table.
Overall distribution
- Total “opposes”
- 15.7%
Full table by respondent group
| Response | Overall | Secular | Traditional | Religious and Haredi | Jewish | Arab |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Strongly supports | 15.0% | 12.2% | 17.6% | 17.2% | 15.0% | 14.8% |
| Leans toward support | 35.1% | 38.6% | 37.4% | 37.4% | 38.0% | 17.6% |
| Neutral | 20.0% | 18.6% | 21.5% | 19.0% | 19.6% | 22.5% |
| Leans toward opposition | 13.1% | 17.1% | 11.8% | 9.8% | 13.9% | 7.7% |
| Strongly opposes | 2.6% | 2.7% | 1.7% | 3.1% | 2.4% | 3.5% |
| Don't know | 14.3% | 10.8% | 10.0% | 13.5% | 11.0% | 33.8% |
| Total “supports” | 50.0% | 50.9% | 55.0% | 54.6% | 53.0% | 32.4% |
| Total “opposes” | 15.7% | 19.8% | 13.5% | 12.9% | 16.4% | 11.3% |
| Total | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% |
| N | 1003 | 409 | 289 | 163 | 861 | 142 |
The largest perceived threats
Iran's nuclear program and affiliated armed forces led the ten-year threat list at 28.1%, followed by division within Israel (24.0%). Internal division was named by 24.7% of Jewish and 19.7% of Arab respondents; armed groups by 17.2% and 7.0%. Western isolation was more often selected by secular respondents (14.7%) than by traditional (9.0%) or religious and Haredi respondents (5.5%).
The largest perceived threats
Percentages. Full responses and sample bases are in the table.
By religious identification
| Secular | Traditional | Religious and Haredi | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Iran and affiliated forces | Secular26.9% | Traditional29.1% | Religious and Haredi31.9% |
| Pressure and Western isolation | Secular14.7% | Traditional9.0% | Religious and Haredi5.5% |
Full table by respondent group
| Response | Overall | Secular | Traditional | Religious and Haredi | Jewish | Arab |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Iran: nuclear program and affiliated armed forces in the region | 28.1% | 26.9% | 29.1% | 31.9% | 28.6% | 25.4% |
| Internal division in Israeli society | 24.0% | 24.4% | 26.0% | 23.3% | 24.7% | 19.7% |
| Armed organizations (Hamas, Hezbollah, etc., as listed in the questionnaire) | 15.8% | 17.6% | 15.6% | 19.0% | 17.2% | 7.0% |
| International pressure and Western isolation | 11.5% | 14.7% | 9.0% | 5.5% | 11.0% | 14.1% |
| Turkey: military expansion and a bloc of Muslim countries | 9.7% | 9.8% | 12.5% | 8.0% | 10.3% | 5.6% |
| Don't know | 8.0% | 4.6% | 6.6% | 8.0% | 5.9% | 20.4% |
| None represents a significant threat in the next ten years | 3.0% | 2.0% | 1.4% | 4.3% | 2.2% | 7.7% |
| Total | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% |
| N | 1003 | 409 | 289 | 163 | 861 | 142 |
How the perceived Iranian threat has changed
Relative to the period before the direct confrontation in April 2024, 32.1% thought the threat had risen, 29.9% fallen and 28.8% stayed the same; 9.2% did not know. A decline was reported by 24.7% of secular, 36.0% of traditional and 44.2% of religious and Haredi respondents. The Jewish and Arab shares reporting a decline were 32.2% and 16.2%.
How the perceived Iranian threat has changed
Percentages. Full responses and sample bases are in the table.
By religious identification
| Secular | Traditional | Religious and Haredi | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Total “rose” | Secular38.4% | Traditional27.0% | Religious and Haredi23.9% |
| Total “fell” | Secular24.7% | Traditional36.0% | Religious and Haredi44.2% |
Full table by respondent group
| Response | Overall | Secular | Traditional | Religious and Haredi | Jewish | Arab |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Threat rose substantially | 18.2% | 23.5% | 14.2% | 10.4% | 17.9% | 20.4% |
| Threat rose somewhat | 13.9% | 14.9% | 12.8% | 13.5% | 13.9% | 13.4% |
| Threat unchanged | 28.8% | 29.3% | 30.1% | 24.5% | 28.7% | 29.6% |
| Threat fell somewhat | 18.6% | 17.1% | 20.8% | 24.5% | 19.7% | 12.0% |
| Threat fell substantially | 11.3% | 7.6% | 15.2% | 19.6% | 12.4% | 4.2% |
| Don't know | 9.2% | 7.6% | 6.9% | 7.4% | 7.3% | 20.4% |
| Total “rose” | 32.1% | 38.4% | 27.0% | 23.9% | 31.8% | 33.8% |
| Total “fell” | 29.9% | 24.7% | 36.0% | 44.2% | 32.2% | 16.2% |
| Total | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% |
| N | 1003 | 409 | 289 | 163 | 861 | 142 |
Ways Turkey could cause harm, in respondents' view
Support for hostile organizations (22.0%) and direct military pressure (16.7%) were the most frequent named mechanisms. 17.2% did not know and 8.2% saw no significant potential harm. Jewish respondents more often named support for hostile groups (24.4% versus 7.7%) and direct military pressure (17.8% versus 9.9%). The no-significant-harm answer was more common among Arab respondents (18.3% versus 6.5%).
Ways Turkey could cause harm, in respondents' view
Percentages. Full responses and sample bases are in the table.
Full table by respondent group
| Response | Overall | Secular | Traditional | Religious and Haredi | Jewish | Arab |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Support for Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood and other groups hostile to Israel | 22.0% | 24.0% | 24.9% | 24.5% | 24.4% | 7.7% |
| Direct military pressure: Turkish forces or missiles near Israel's borders | 16.7% | 18.3% | 18.7% | 14.7% | 17.8% | 9.9% |
| Turkey cannot cause significant harm in the next ten years | 8.2% | 2.9% | 8.7% | 11.7% | 6.5% | 18.3% |
| Anti-Israel decisions at the UN and international forums | 7.7% | 10.3% | 7.3% | 3.7% | 8.0% | 5.6% |
| Excluding Israel from the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) | 7.3% | 8.1% | 6.9% | 6.7% | 7.4% | 6.3% |
| Cutting off Israel's regional ties with Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and the Gulf | 6.5% | 8.1% | 5.2% | 3.1% | 6.2% | 8.5% |
| Portraying Israel internationally as a pariah state | 5.9% | 5.9% | 7.3% | 6.1% | 6.4% | 2.8% |
| Advancing recognition of a Palestinian state | 3.9% | 3.9% | 4.2% | 3.1% | 3.8% | 4.2% |
| Increasing anti-Israel sentiment in East Jerusalem | 2.3% | 2.4% | 2.4% | 1.8% | 2.3% | 2.1% |
| Prosecuting Israelis in international courts | 1.1% | 0.7% | 0.7% | 0.6% | 0.7% | 3.5% |
| Any of these | 1.1% | 1.0% | 1.4% | 1.8% | 1.3% | 0.0% |
| Other means | 0.2% | 0.5% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.2% | 0.0% |
| Don't know | 17.2% | 13.9% | 12.5% | 22.1% | 15.0% | 31.0% |
| Total | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% |
| N | 1003 | 409 | 289 | 163 | 861 | 142 |
Three values in the original figure for the first question differ from the source table. The web charts use the table: 28.6%, 22.9%, and 1.2%.
