An archival publication of the late June 2026 survey. The findings do not report election results.

Key findings

54.7%

See the country on the wrong track

26.4%

Name the economy as their top issue

29.2%

Prefer Netanyahu for prime minister

N = 1006

Respondents in the full sample

How Israeli political preferences fit together before the election

Methodology

Dor Moriah designed the questionnaire and Geocartography conducted fieldwork in late June 2026. The nationwide online sample comprised 1,006 adults aged 18 and over, with Jewish and Arab respondents represented in proportion to their population shares. The reported maximum margin of error is ±3.1 percentage points at 95% confidence for the overall sample, not for subgroups. The report examines substantive differences supported by chi-square tests at p < 0.05. Seven-point scales are grouped as 1–3, 4 and 5–7. Jewish respondents self-identified as secular, traditional or religious, the latter including Haredim.

A civil constitution or Halakha

52.8% chose the civil constitution end of the scale, 20.0% Torah law and 21.5% an equal combination. An unequivocal preference for a constitution was the most frequent single answer (29.7%, versus 8.5% for Halakha). The secular group favored a constitution (76.8% versus 5.2%; mean 2.2); the religious group favored Torah law (67.3% versus 11.4%; mean 5.3). Traditional respondents were between these positions (36.2% versus 22.7%; 35.1% chose equal weight). Arab respondents favored a constitution over Torah law by 64.0% to 3.8%.

A civil constitution or Halakha

Percentages. Full responses and sample bases are in the table.

Overall distribution

Constitution (1–3)
52.8%
4 — Both equally
21.5%
Halakha (5–7)
20.0%
Don't know
5.7%
Full table by respondent group
Table 1. A civil constitution or Halakha
ResponseOverallSecularTraditionalReligious and HarediJewishArab
1 — Civil constitution29.7%45.3%14.3%4.8%27.3%42.9%
213.2%18.2%10.4%4.2%12.9%14.7%
39.9%13.3%11.5%2.4%10.6%6.4%
4 — Both equally21.5%15.3%35.1%17.0%22.1%17.9%
56.2%3.0%7.2%16.4%6.9%1.9%
65.3%1.5%6.5%17.0%6.1%0.6%
7 — Torah law (Halakha)8.5%0.7%9.0%33.9%9.9%1.3%
Don't know5.7%2.7%6.1%4.2%4.1%14.1%
Weighted mean3.12.23.75.33.32.2
Valid N949395262158815134

How respondents see the state today

The most frequent answer was an equal balance between secular and religious features (27.5%); unequivocal answers were rarer, 9.3% secular and 4.3% religious. The two ends nearly tied: 34.1% saw Israel as more secular and 34.6% as more religious. Secular respondents more often saw Israel as religious (42.8% versus 30.9%), and religious respondents more often saw it as secular (49.8% versus 26.6%). This is a perception measure, not an institutional classification.

Table 2. How respondents see the state today
ResponseOverallSecularTraditionalReligious and HarediJewishArab
1 — Secular9.3%9.4%8.6%7.3%8.7%12.8%
210.1%9.4%9.0%16.4%10.6%7.7%
314.7%12.1%14.3%26.1%15.5%10.3%
4 — Equally27.5%24.1%36.6%21.2%27.6%26.9%
518.7%24.6%15.4%13.9%19.5%14.1%
611.6%13.8%9.7%8.5%11.4%12.8%
7 — Religious4.3%4.4%2.5%4.2%3.8%7.1%
Don't know3.7%2.2%3.9%2.4%2.8%8.3%
Valid N969397268161826143

The country's direction

54.7% rated the direction negatively, 25.9% positively and 13.8% chose the midpoint. The most frequent individual answer was the negative endpoint, at 22.1%. Negative ratings reached 70.6% among secular respondents and 55.1% among Arab respondents. The religious group was the only one where positive answers outweighed negative ones (42.4% versus 38.1%), without reaching an absolute majority. Traditional respondents split 35.5% positive to 40.8% negative.

The country's direction

Percentages. Full responses and sample bases are in the table.

Overall distribution

1 — Right direction

25.9%

4 — Midpoint

13.8%

7 — Wrong direction

54.7%

Don't know

5.6%

Government performance

Satisfied

27.9%

Dissatisfied

67.4%

Don’t know

4.6%
Full table by respondent group
Table 3. The country's direction
ResponseOverallSecularTraditionalReligious and HarediJewishArab
1 — Right direction7.2%3.0%9.3%13.9%7.2%7.1%
210.1%6.7%13.3%17.6%10.9%5.8%
38.6%5.7%12.9%10.9%9.1%6.4%
4 — Midpoint13.8%12.1%15.8%12.7%13.4%16.0%
516.2%18.7%16.8%12.7%16.9%12.2%
616.4%20.4%12.5%14.5%16.7%14.7%
7 — Wrong direction22.1%31.5%11.5%10.9%20.9%28.2%
Don't know5.6%2.0%7.9%6.7%4.8%9.6%
Valid N950398257154809141

Models for a political settlement

The largest share, 42.8%, regarded neither of the two proposed arrangements as fair, compared with 27.6% for two states and 14.8% for one state. Neither option was favored by 48.8% of Jewish respondents and 67.3% of religious respondents. Two states received 48.1% among Arab respondents and 23.9% among Jewish respondents. Rejection of both options does not identify a single agreed alternative.

Table 4. Models for a political settlement
ResponseOverallSecularTraditionalReligious and HarediJewishArab
Two states for two peoples27.6%33.0%17.9%11.5%23.9%48.1%
One state for two peoples14.8%11.3%16.1%13.3%13.3%23.1%
Neither is fair42.8%41.1%49.1%67.3%48.8%10.3%
Don't know14.7%14.5%16.8%7.9%14.0%18.6%

Satisfaction with the government

67.4% were dissatisfied and 27.9% satisfied. The strongest negative answer alone accounted for 42.3%. Dissatisfaction was 81.5% among secular respondents and 79.5% among Arab respondents. Among religious respondents satisfaction was 49.7% and dissatisfaction 44.9%; among traditional respondents the respective figures were 42.6% and 53.7%. The companion analysis shows that 18.2% of those satisfied with the government still saw the country as heading in the wrong direction.

Table 5. Satisfaction with the government
ResponseOverallSecularTraditionalReligious and HarediJewishArab
Very satisfied8.8%3.2%13.6%18.8%9.6%4.5%
Fairly satisfied19.1%12.8%29.0%30.9%21.6%5.1%
Not very satisfied25.1%23.9%26.5%29.7%25.9%21.2%
Not at all satisfied42.3%57.6%27.2%15.2%39.4%58.3%
Don't know4.6%2.5%3.6%5.5%3.4%10.9%

Western and non-Western partnerships

41.4% leaned toward the United States and Europe, 21.1% toward non-Western countries and 26.4% gave both equal weight. Extreme answers were less common than in the constitutional question. Secular respondents were the most Western-oriented (54.5% versus 16.5%; mean 4.9); among religious respondents the two sides were close (30.5% versus 28.5%; mean 4.1).

Table 6. Western and non-Western partnerships
ResponseOverallSecularTraditionalReligious and HarediJewishArab
1 — Non-Western countries4.5%2.5%4.5%7.5%4.1%7.0%
26.8%5.0%7.0%9.0%6.4%9.0%
39.8%9.0%10.0%12.0%9.9%9.5%
4 — Both equally26.4%22.0%31.0%28.0%26.0%28.5%
514.7%18.0%14.0%12.0%15.6%10.0%
612.8%17.0%11.0%9.5%13.7%8.0%
7 — United States and Europe13.9%19.5%11.0%9.0%14.8%9.0%
Don't know11.1%7.0%11.5%13.0%9.6%19.0%
Sum 1–321.1%16.5%21.5%28.5%20.4%25.5%
Sum 5–741.4%54.5%36.0%30.5%44.1%27.0%
Weighted mean4.54.94.44.14.64.1

Government efforts outside the West

29.4% rated these efforts highly and 30.3% poorly; 26.6% chose a middle rating, the most frequent single answer. High ratings reached 50.3% among religious respondents, while 39.2% of secular respondents gave low or nearly absent ratings. These ratings track overall views of the government, even though secular respondents also identified many untapped opportunities.

Table 7. Government efforts outside the West
ResponseOverallSecularTraditionalReligious and HarediJewishArab
Very high8.0%4.7%9.3%16.4%8.5%5.1%
Fairly high21.4%17.2%28.7%33.9%24.2%5.8%
Moderate26.6%28.3%29.0%20.0%26.9%25.0%
Low16.0%19.2%14.0%9.7%15.6%17.9%
Virtually absent14.3%20.0%7.2%4.2%12.7%23.1%
Don't know13.7%10.6%11.8%15.8%12.0%23.1%

Untapped cooperation

The Gulf states (29.7%), China (26.2%) and Southeast Asia (25.0%) were the most frequently named opportunities. Russia was named by 16.6%; 29.0% did not know. Secular respondents selected more options (231.5% summed across choices) than religious respondents (187.3%); 35.8% of the latter did not know. This multiple-choice measure describes perceived opportunities, not a preferred strategic ally.

Table 8. Untapped cooperation
ResponseOverallSecularTraditionalReligious and HarediJewishArab
Gulf states29.7%37.4%26.5%22.4%30.9%23.1%
China26.2%29.8%26.9%21.8%27.3%20.5%
Southeast Asia25.0%31.5%24.0%23.0%27.4%11.5%
South America23.6%28.1%23.3%21.2%25.2%14.7%
Africa23.1%30.8%21.9%15.8%24.9%12.8%
India21.7%29.3%17.9%24.2%24.6%5.8%
Russia16.6%17.0%16.8%13.3%16.2%18.6%
No such country5.4%2.0%5.7%9.7%4.7%9.0%
Don't know29.0%24.4%27.2%35.8%27.5%37.2%
Sum of selections200.7%231.5%190.3%187.3%209.4%153.2%

The single most important election issue

Economics (26.4%) narrowly led security (24.9%). The economy mattered across groups; conscription of Haredim, accountability for October 7 and judicial reform differed more by group. Among Arab respondents, security accounted for 7.7% versus 28.0% among Jewish respondents; violence in society and in Arab communities together reached 32.7%, ahead of economics (23.7%).

Table 9. The single most important election issue
ResponseOverallSecularTraditionalReligious and HarediJewishArab
Economy26.4%24.4%30.1%27.9%26.9%23.7%
Security24.9%22.9%31.9%33.9%28.0%7.7%
Haredi conscription10.3%14.8%8.2%9.7%11.6%3.2%
Judicial reform8.0%7.4%7.9%12.1%8.5%5.1%
Violence in society7.5%6.7%5.4%4.8%5.9%16.0%
Accountability for October 76.1%9.4%5.0%2.4%6.6%3.2%
Violence in Arab communities3.8%2.2%1.1%0.0%1.4%16.7%
Religion and state3.4%5.7%1.4%1.8%3.5%2.6%
Other2.3%2.7%2.5%1.8%2.5%1.3%
Don't know7.5%3.9%6.5%5.5%5.1%20.5%

Other issues voters consider important

With multiple answers allowed, 71.2% selected the economy and 65.3% security, followed by violence in society (46.0%), Haredi conscription (42.7%) and both judicial reform and October 7 accountability (37.2% each). Haredi conscription was selected by 57.9% of secular and 10.9% of Arab respondents. October 7 accountability was selected by 48.3% of secular and 25.5% of religious respondents.

Table 10. Other issues voters consider important
ResponseOverallSecularTraditionalReligious and HarediJewishArab
Economy71.2%72.4%73.5%77.0%73.6%57.7%
Security65.3%69.7%71.3%73.3%70.9%34.6%
Violence in society46.0%50.7%41.9%37.6%45.3%50.0%
Haredi conscription42.7%57.9%41.2%38.2%48.6%10.9%
Judicial reform37.2%38.9%37.3%45.5%39.6%23.7%
Accountability for October 737.2%48.3%37.3%25.5%40.2%20.5%
Violence in Arab communities32.4%33.5%28.0%23.0%29.6%47.4%
Religion and state30.0%40.9%22.9%29.1%32.7%15.4%

Preferred prime minister

Netanyahu led with 29.2%, 10.0 percentage points ahead of Eisenkot (19.2%); Bennett was at 16.2%. Netanyahu received 55.8% among religious, 45.5% among traditional, 16.3% among secular and 5.8% among Arab respondents. Five other candidates together received 45.7%. The companion analysis shows a 21.4-point gap between Netanyahu (60.9%) and Likud (39.5%) among people who thought the country was on the right track; these are answers to different questions.

Preferred prime minister

Percentages. Full responses and sample bases are in the table.

Overall distribution

Benjamin Netanyahu

29.2%

Gadi Eisenkot

19.2%

Naftali Bennett

16.2%

Avigdor Lieberman

4.2%

Yair Lapid

3.8%

Itamar Ben-Gvir

3.6%

Benny Gantz

2.3%
Full table by respondent group
Table 11. Preferred prime minister
ResponseOverallSecularTraditionalReligious and HarediJewishArab
Benjamin Netanyahu29.2%16.3%45.5%55.8%33.5%5.8%
Gadi Eisenkot19.2%29.1%12.9%6.1%19.3%18.6%
Naftali Bennett16.2%25.1%13.6%6.1%17.6%8.3%
Avigdor Lieberman4.2%6.7%3.2%2.4%4.7%1.3%
Yair Lapid3.8%4.2%1.1%0.0%2.4%11.5%
Itamar Ben-Gvir3.6%2.5%5.0%7.3%4.2%0.0%
Benny Gantz2.3%3.2%1.8%0.6%2.2%2.6%
Bezalel Smotrich0.6%0.2%0.4%2.4%0.7%0.0%
Aryeh Deri0.6%0.5%0.7%0.6%0.6%0.6%
Yitzhak Goldknopf0.5%0.0%0.0%0.6%0.1%2.6%
None of them10.5%6.4%6.1%13.3%7.6%26.3%
Don't know9.3%5.9%9.7%4.8%6.9%22.4%

Intention to vote

87.1% said they intended to vote; 65.9% said they definitely would. Definite intent was 68.2% among Jewish respondents and 53.2% among Arab respondents. Another 16.7% of Arab respondents were undecided about voting. Reported intent is not observed turnout.

Table 12. Intention to vote
ResponseOverallSecularTraditionalReligious and HarediJewishArab
Definitely will vote65.9%73.4%65.6%60.0%68.2%53.2%
Probably will vote21.2%19.7%21.5%29.1%22.1%16.0%
Probably will not vote3.8%3.2%4.3%3.0%3.5%5.1%
Definitely will not vote2.8%0.5%2.2%3.6%1.6%9.0%
Don't know6.4%3.2%6.5%4.2%4.5%16.7%

Party preferences

Likud led at 19.3%. The report groups the then coalition parties at 32.1%, Jewish opposition lists at 44.1% and Arab parties at 4.5%; 14.8% had not decided, including 31.4% of Arab respondents. Bennett–Lapid received 15.5% and Eisenkot 13.5% in the options surveyed. These are June response shares, not a seat projection or election result.

Table 13. Party preferences
ResponseOverallSecularTraditionalReligious and HarediJewishArab
Likud (Netanyahu)19.3%14.0%35.5%17.6%21.8%5.8%
Bennett + Lapid15.5%24.1%13.3%3.6%16.6%9.6%
Eisenkot13.5%21.9%11.1%4.2%14.9%5.8%
The Democrats (Golan)6.9%10.8%1.4%2.4%6.1%10.9%
Otzma Yehudit (Ben-Gvir)6.6%4.2%9.0%14.5%7.8%0.0%
Yisrael Beiteinu5.9%8.6%6.5%2.4%6.7%1.3%
Shas (Deri)2.7%0.0%2.5%11.5%3.1%0.6%
Religious Zionism2.6%0.5%1.1%12.7%3.1%0.0%
Gantz2.3%3.2%2.2%0.6%2.4%1.9%
Joint List2.0%0.0%0.0%0.0%0.0%12.8%
Hadash–Ta'al1.4%0.0%0.0%0.0%0.0%9.0%
Ra'am1.1%0.0%0.0%0.0%0.0%7.1%
United Torah Judaism0.9%0.0%0.4%4.8%1.1%0.0%
Other party4.7%2.5%4.3%11.5%4.8%3.8%
Don't know14.8%10.1%12.9%13.9%11.8%31.4%

Confidence in the choice

Among decided respondents, 90.2% said they were confident and 43.9% very confident. The strongest level reached 50.7% among religious respondents and 52.3% among Arab respondents. Stated confidence at the time of a survey cannot rule out later changes.

Table 14. Confidence in the choice
ResponseOverallSecularTraditionalReligious and HarediJewishArab
Very confident43.9%37.8%45.3%50.7%42.7%52.3%
Fairly confident46.3%52.1%46.9%36.6%47.5%38.3%
Not very confident9.2%9.9%7.8%11.3%9.5%7.5%
Not at all confident0.6%0.3%0.0%1.4%0.4%1.9%

What drives party choice

The leader's personality ranked first (30.9%), followed by security (17.5%), the character of the state (16.2%) and the economy (9.6%). Leader identity was prominent among secular and traditional respondents (34.2% and 35.8%). Religious respondents were more evenly split across the leader, state character, security and community identity. Among Arab respondents, community identity (18.7%) and the economy (15.0%) carried more weight.

Table 15. What drives party choice
ResponseOverallSecularTraditionalReligious and HarediJewishArab
Leader's personality30.9%34.2%35.8%21.8%32.4%20.6%
Security and strategic policy17.5%14.2%24.7%19.7%18.7%9.3%
Character of the state16.2%20.3%9.5%21.1%16.9%11.2%
Economy and cost of living9.6%6.8%12.3%7.7%8.8%15.0%
Community or group affiliation8.3%4.4%5.3%15.5%6.8%18.7%
Position on investigating October 75.4%6.3%3.7%1.4%4.5%11.2%
Position on Haredi conscription4.7%6.6%1.6%5.6%4.8%3.7%
Other reason5.7%4.9%4.9%7.0%5.3%8.4%
Don't know1.8%2.2%2.1%0.0%1.7%1.9%
Valid N857365243142750107

Perceived readiness to cooperate with Arab parties

49.9% thought the opposition more willing to cooperate with Arab parties and 7.9% named the coalition. The opposition was named by 71.5% of religious respondents. Among Arab respondents, 20.5% said neither side and 31.4% did not know. The result reflects perceived willingness, not a commitment from a party.

Table 16. Perceived readiness to cooperate with Arab parties
ResponseOverallSecularTraditionalReligious and HarediJewishArab
Opposition49.9%48.0%50.5%71.5%53.4%30.8%
Coalition7.9%8.6%10.0%4.8%8.4%5.1%
Both equally11.8%16.0%9.3%5.5%11.8%12.2%
Neither11.4%9.9%10.0%9.1%9.8%20.5%
Don't know19.0%17.5%20.1%9.1%16.7%31.4%

What the June survey shows

The survey records broad dissatisfaction with the government alongside divided alternatives. Economic concerns were shared, but constitutional preferences, security and conscription split groups differently. The report identifies list configurations and differences in voting intention as uncertainties. It describes opinions at the time of fieldwork; it does not predict later turnout, seats or coalition formation.